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How a nation interacts with its indigenous peoples, and 
deals with injustices will ultimately become part of that 
country’s . . . identity.1 
— Georgina Te Heuheu, Minister of Women’s Affairs 
 
 †  J.D., University of Minnesota Law School;  A.M.R.S., University of  
Chicago; Senior Researcher, Institute on Race & Poverty; Adjunct Faculty  
in Theology, University of St. Thomas. 
 1. Richard Knight, Maori Sales Label Touted, N.Z. HERALD, June 22, 1999, at 
A16. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As Americans, we commonly assume that the world takes 
lessons from us—or at least that the world fancies observing us as 
much as De Tocqueville did in the 19th century.  I believe that the 
reverse works just as well, if not better, and that, indeed, it is our 
responsibility to learn from the experiences of other nations.  In 
my case, observing the experience(s) of the Maori—the indigenous 
population of New Zealand—teaches me much about the civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights of indigenous 
populations and urban persons of color, as well as about the state 
of democracy in a neo-liberal, global economy.  Without presuming 
to be like De Tocqueville in any way, I will share here what I have 
learned from a year-long stay in 1999 in hopes of reinvigorating our 
own post-civil rights movement—which at its heart is the struggle to 
construct a more just and equitable multiracial democracy. 
I must preface my remarks, however, by admitting a few things. 
First, I am a civil rights attorney only in so far as is demanded of me 
at the Institute on Race & Poverty at the University of Minnesota 
Law School in the fight against racial and economic injustice.  
Therefore, when I refer to “the cause” I am speaking in a very 
broad sense about the equalization of opportunities for persons of 
color, not only in terms of civil rights, but also in terms of full 
participation in the democratic process.  Second, I am far more 
informed about the plight of urban persons of color than I am 
about that of indigenous persons—especially in rural areas.  
However, the cumulative effects of institutional racism and 
concentrated poverty affect both populations, especially where the 
populations intersect, as is the case with urban Maori.  And last, I 
am admitting ahead of time that I capture only as much of Maori 
experience(s) as I can as a visitor and as a Pakeha or “person of 
predominantly European descent.”2 
In the main part of the article, after an overview of race and 
identity in New Zealand, I will locate Maori experience(s) within 
two general contexts—namely in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi 
and in reaction to the recent neo-liberal economic reform.  
 
 2. H.W. WILLIAMS, A DICTIONARY OF THE MAORI LANGUAGE 252 (1975).  All 
further translations will be drawn from this source.  To pronounce Maori words, 
use the following sounds: a  = ah, as in “pa”; e = ay, as in “day”; i = ee, as in “fee”; o 
= oh, as in “no”; and u = oo, as in “too.”  The “ng” sound resembles the “ng” sound 
in “tongue.  The “wh” sound is commonly pronounced as “f.”  The “r” sound is 
rolled off the tongue, not formed in the throat. 
2
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Examining the Treaty—with its much-debated notion of 
rangatiratanga (self determination/sovereignty)—will require an 
exploration of political and civil rights.  Examining the neo-liberal 
reform, in turn, will require a closer look at economic and social 
rights.  In the second part of the article, I will attempt to discern 
several patterns that emerge with which to implicate our own cause. 
II. MAORI EXPERIENCE(S) IN CONTEXT 
A.  A Brief Overview of Race and Identity 
1.  Contemporary Inter- and Intra-racial Tensions 
We cannot sleepwalk to the goal of a racially harmonious 
society.3 
— Dr. Rajen Prasad, Race Relations Conciliator, New Zealand 
Guidebooks commonly promote New Zealand as “a country of 
racial harmony” with “a renewed interest in Maoritanga (Maori way 
of life)”4 and a “high standard of living.”5  As would be expected, 
this depiction is incomplete.  The relationships within the nation 
are far more complex and contentious and the standard of living 
far more racialized. 
According to the 1996 census, New Zealand’s 3.68 million 
population includes approximately 14% Maori, 10% Asian, 6% 
Pacific Islanders,6 and 70% Pakeha.7  As in the United States, 
however, the racial and ethnic makeup of the population will 
 
 3. Karen Burge, Major Changes to Cultural Landscape by Mid-century, N.Z. 
HERALD, March 22, 1999, at A3. 
 4. JANE KING, NEW ZEALAND HANDBOOK 13 (1990). 
 5. Id. at 16. 
 6. Pacific Islanders have been in New Zealand for more than 100 years, with 
migration increasing rapidly in the 1960s. Id. They currently make up almost 6% 
of the population and include Samoans, Tongans, Fijians, Cook Islanders, 
Tokelauans, and Niueans. Id. at 3. They are diverse in culture and language, but 
share common migration and assimilation history.  Id. at 8. MINISTRY OF PACIFIC 
ISLAND AFFAIRS, NAVIGATING THE CURRENTS OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM: A SPECIAL 
REPORT 8 (1999)(discussing the changing familial and societal structures of Pacific 
peoples in New Zealand)[hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT]. 
 7. MASON DURIE, TE MANA, TE KAWANATANGA: THE POLITICS OF MAORI SELF-
DETERMINATION 86 (1998).  Forty percent of Maori are under the age of 15.  Id.  
Elderly Maori will increase from 3% in 1991 to 13% in 2031.  Id.  Elderly will likely 
be less familiar with customs and culture and unable to count on consistent 
whanau (family) support. Id. 
3
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change dramatically in the near future.  By 2046, the proportion of 
Pakeha will drop to only half the population at around 2.5 million.  
Maori population will almost double and Asian and Pacific Islander 
more than triple.8 
The relationship between Pakeha and Maori receives the lion’s 
share of attention—largely due to the historic nature of colonizer 
and colonized.  Whether this relationship is a positive one is 
contended. One Pakeha scholar, Peter Munz, believes that all is 
well in New Zealand because Maori are geographically mixed with 
Pakeha and not locked in reservations “with food and beer” like the 
“Red Indians”, or trapped in homelands like the South Africans.9  
But Ella Henry, a Maori of Nga Puhi, argues that there is little 
evidence the two races are coming together. “What Pakeha fail to 
understand,” says Henry, “is that they get on with Maori because 
Maori have made the effort . . . Pakeha cannot accept that the 
sacrifice made by Maori has robbed us of our personal identity and 
mana (honor).  If the tension is not obvious it is because we have 
been trying so hard to be like them . . . .”10 
Assimilation of Maori into Pakeha ways appears to be the 
norm.11  As one Pakeha former Race Relations Conciliator admits, 
“the power of the numbers and the overwhelming weight of 
western culture combine to make for an irresistible one way flow of 
cultural traffic. . . . Consciously and unconsciously we have been 
folding the culture of the Maori into what we regarded as better for 
all.” 12  Indeed, when the English settlers carved out their territories 
they displayed a “wonderfully cavalier disregard of the . . . local 
terrain” instead drawing “an orderly, linear, culturally 
straightjacketed response . . . antithetical to the endlessly curving, 
flowing line of Maori design.”13  Munz argues that assimilation is 
the “essence of human history” and cannot be prevented.  He 
 
 8. Burge, supra note 3, at A3. 
 9. CAROL ARCHIE, MAORI SOVEREIGNTY: THE PAKEHA PERSPECTIVE 99 (1995). 
 10. HINEANI MELBOURNE, MAORI SOVEREIGNTY: THE MAORI PERSPECTIVE 22 
(1995). Henry even believes that groundwork has been set for gang warfare and 
civil disturbance.  Id. 
 11. CHRIS LAIDLAW, RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: BEYOND THE NEW ZEALAND IDENTITY 
CRISIS 160 (1999). 
 12. Id. at 159. One prominent Pakeha captures the essence of this subjugation 
when he claims, “[a]ll people may be of equal value; but, although we should 
respect the good in all cultures, we cannot say that Maori and European 
contributions to civilization are equal.”  DAVID ROUND, TRUTH OR TREATY: COMMON 
SENSE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 79 (1998). 
 13. LAIDLAW, supra note 11, at 26. 
4
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claims that no ethnic identity lasts very long, including Maori.14 
Economic subjugation of Maori accompanies this assimilative 
process.  Maori (as well as the Pacific Islanders) experience among 
the lowest income levels; the highest rates of unemployment and 
single-parent families; the poorest health; the lowest educational 
enrollment and achievement; and the highest representation in 
subsidized housing, government-funded income support, and the 
criminal justice system.15  As Waireti Walters, a health worker, puts 
it, “Here we are as Maori in our own country and we are still 
begging under the table to the white man.  We always seem to be 
deprived or second class.”16 
Some Pakeha, lamenting the preferential treatment Maori 
sometimes receive to compensate for this subjugation, claim that 
Maori “simply can’t hack it on a level playing field.”17  Many even 
complain of positive discrimination to the Race Relations Office.  
According to the 1999 Race Relations Conciliator, Dr. Rajen 
Prasad, the level of discomfort among non-Maori is increasing.18  It 
appears that “biculturalism” for Pakeha is “no more than a limited 
indulgence; but for the Maori it is a matter of survival.”19 
Survival is particularly daunting for urban Maori.  Prior to 
World War II, 90% of Maori lived in rural areas and predominantly 
within their iwi (tribal) domains.  After an economic boom, labor 
demands increased in urban areas drawing Maori in.20  Currently, 
80% of Maori live in the main urban centers, with about 25% in 
Auckland alone.21 As anthropologist Steven Webster notes, 
 
 14. ARCHIE, supra note 9, at 94.  Munz is Professor Emeritus of History at 
Victoria University. Id. at 93.  Munz goes on to say, “[s]ome Maori think they came 
here ready-made in canoes.  But they didn’t.”  Id. at 96. 
 15. SPECIAL REPORT supra note 6, at 8. 
 16. MELBOURNE, supra note 10, at 57. Often Maori are not even welcome at 
the table, as was evident during my stay, for example, in Howick, a suburb of 
Auckland where Pakeha were trying to keep Maori out of the area and prevent 
them from establishing a marae (meeting house).  See  Scott Kara, Marae Word a 
Canker in Garden of Memories, N.Z. HERALD, Dec. 4-5, 1999, at A4. 
 17. Frank Haden, It’s An Unlevel Playing Field at the 2000 Maori Olympics, SUN. 
STAR TIMES, Oct. 10, 1999, at C4. 
 18. Jenny Forsyth, Changing Face of Race Complaints, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 27, 
1999, at A13. 
 19. LAIDLAW, supra note 11, at 159. 
 20. Paul Meredith, Urban Maori as “New Citizens”: The Quest for 
Recognition and Resources, Paper Presented to the Revisioning Citizenship in 
New Zealand Conference 2-3 (Feb. 22-24, 2000) available at Te Matahauariki 
Institute, http://www.lianz.waikato.ac.nz/. 
 21. DURIE, supra note 7, at 86.  This would include areas of 30,000 or more 
such as Auckland and Hamilton. Id.  Because of unemployment, however, there is 
5
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“[I]mmigrant  ‘others’ are tolerated primarily because their labour 
is used to build industries . . . [or] they are not tolerated and must 
live. . . apart from the [Pakeha].”22  He goes on to say that “the 
persistent myth that [Maori] are a ‘rural’ people only recently 
having ‘drifted’ to the cities entrenches their status as ‘immigrants’ 
in their own home.” 23 
Because of increasing urban migration, the initial housing 
policy of “pepper-potting”—dispersing Maori families throughout 
urban centers—was superceded by that of allocating Maori to state-
built homes in large housing estates.24  The resulting racial 
polarization is particularly evident in Auckland, where affluent 
coastal and inner-city suburbs are dominated by aging Pakeha and 
less affluent areas by ethnic minorities and families with young 
children.  Within ten years, only half of all Auckland residents will 
be Pakeha.  Urban renewal strategies have neither stemmed this 
white flight nor provided the appropriate mix of housing options 
needed to avoid increased crime, health problems, and antisocial 
behavior in high-density, low-income areas.25  As a result, a 
widening income gap and rising housing prices are producing a 
metropolitan community of  “haves” and “have-nots.”26 
Urban Maori also have to contend with living apart from and 
in tension with rural iwi (tribes).  At least 70% of all Maori live 
outside their tribal rohe (boundaries) and approximately one-third 
live without any tribal influence at all.27  This urbanization process 
has led to cultural losses, disenfranchisement of urban Maori from 
their tribal land and origins, and socio-economic difficulties, 
especially without whanau (kin) to fall back on.28  Although “iwi” 
traditionally meant “the people”, its current “tribal” meaning has 
empowered rural iwi elders to further ghettoize urban Maori and 
 
a trend toward migration back to tribal areas such as the Northland. Id.  Also, 
some 26,000 Maori are recorded living in Australia. Id. 
 22. STEVEN WEBSTER, PATRONS OF MAORI CULTURE: POWER, THEORY AND 
IDEOLOGY IN THE MAORI RENAISSANCE 11 (University of Otgao Press 1998) 
 23. Id. 
 24. Meredith, supra note 20, at 3. 
 25. Geoff Cumming & Scott Kara, Planning Vital to Avoid Slums: High-Density 
Housing Can Have its Pitfalls, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 24, 1999, at A7. 
 26. Geoff Cumming, Ethnic Melting Pot on the Way, N.Z. HERALD, Aug. 18, 
1999, at A8.  “By 2021 the region will house 1.5 million people, 34% of New 
Zealand’s population.” Id. 
 27. Meredith, supra note 20, at 17-18.  At the 1996 census, 25% of Maori 
either didn’t know their iwi or chose not to affiliate with it.  Id. at 18. 
 28. Id. at 4. 
6
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relinquish them to a lesser status, both within the Maori 
community as well as within the nation as a whole.29  In fact, the 
“iwi” has become the “master narrative for constructing the 
identities and citizenship of Maori in the present.” 30  As a result, a 
powerful urban Maori sensibility has emerged that strives to 
legitimize the realities of being Maori in the city and secure the 
right to be recognized.31  Through a shared social and political 
commitment, urban Maori have created politically active voluntary 
associations, pursued litigation, and nurtured economic 
development.32  In addition, they have recreated traditional Maori 
structures of whanau, hapu (subtribe) and iwi and replaced them 
with pan-tribal relationships and urban marae (meeting houses).33  
Unfortunately, these types of pan-tribal movements are not always 
well-received and are sometimes viewed as the means by which the 
“power-culture” further tyrannizes the minority.34 
These inter- and intra-racial tensions are also located within a 
multicultural context.  In addition to the significant number of 
Pacific Islanders, population patterns have been significantly 
altered by recent large-scale migrations, mainly from Asia.35  Asks a 
New Zealand Herald editorial, “[I]s this country bicultural or 
multicultural?  It is a question that ought to be answered by all New 
Zealanders.  When all answer, there can be no mistaking the 
multicultural character of this country.”36  Despite the trauma 
associated with being colonized and the subsequent rights secured 
under the Treaty of Waitangi,37 many New Zealanders argue that 
Maori “are not the only cultural minority in need of legal 
protection.”38  Yet, the former Minister of Maori Affairs, Tau 
Henare, resists being crowded out by “newly arriving people” and 
believes priority should be given to Maori issues.39  It seems hard 
enough for the nation to figure out what biracialism means (“[c]an 
 
 29. Id. at 9. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 4. 
 32. Id. at 4-6. 
 33. Id. 
 34. MELBOURNE, supra note 10, at 156. 
 35. Dr. Rajen Prasad, Annual Report of the Race Relations Conciliator for the Year 
Ending 30 June 1996, in 2 HUM. RTS. L. & PRACT. 211, 215 (1997)[ hereinafter 
Annual Report]. 
 36. We’re New Zealanders, N.Z. HERALD, June 24, 1999, at A16. 
 37. See infra Part II. B. 
 38. We’re New Zealanders, supra note 36, at A16. 
 39. Maori Culture ‘Fighting to Survive,’ N.Z. HERALD, June 29, 1999, at A16. 
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it really be a fusion of Maori and Pakeha cultures, each a reflection 
of the other, or is that just a pipe-dream of political correctness?” 40) 
much less multiracialism, despite its appeal.  Some suggest that 
perhaps both are achievable.41 
2.  Maori Culture and Identity 
[T]he preconception of Maori culture as a whole way of 
life ideologically obscures both the present deterioration 
of Maori society and the colonial and recent history which 
has instead constituted Maori culture as a whole way of 
struggle.  The beneficiaries of the cultural “Renaissance” 
may be more its opportunist patrons, Maori as well as 
Pakeha, than the majority of Maori themselves.42 
— Steven Webster, Visiting Anthropologist 
Pakeha columnist Charmaine Pountney writes that most New 
Zealanders are comfortable with the idea of a multi-cultural society 
as long as it means a variety of “costumes, cuisines, or churches.”43  
Without an exploration of different values and ethics, she argues, 
society will not be harmonious.44  However, neither costumes and 
cuisines, nor values and ethics capture the systemic nature of the 
racial tensions and inequalities that persist New Zealand.  Instead, 
argues Webster, Maori culture has the capacity to mask this 
systemic quality. 
Maori culture is fighting to survive in New Zealand.45  Through 
 
 40. LAIDLAW, supra note 11, at 26. 
 41. Id.  According to one report, “From a race relations perspective in the 
New Zealand context, it is inappropriate to see biculturalism and multiculturalism 
as polar opposites.  The term biculturalism is appropriately used to describe the 
Treaty relations between Maori and the Crown, and from this relationship 
emerges a number of rights and responsibilities.  Multiculturalism is therefore not 
a counter to biculturalism because it refers to quite a different image of a society 
and one that rests comfortably with the concept of biculturalism described above.” 
Annual Report, supra note 35, at 215. 
 42. WEBSTER, supra note 22, at 19. 
 43. Charmaine Pountney, Racial Harmony: We Need Different Rooms in a Common 
House, N.Z. HERALD, July 5, 1999, at A13. 
 44. Id.  Charmaine proposes a national code of ethics, or statement of values 
that “would say what we want, as well as what we don’t accept.  It would state what 
we are trying to be, rather than what we are, and it would include no penalties.  It 
would be in clear, simple language and in every language used in our community.  
Discussing and trying to agree on a national code of ethics could provide a useful 
focus for redirecting much of the negativity which infects our national life at 
present.” Id. 
 45. Maori Culture ‘Fighting to Survive,’ N.Z. HERALD, June 29, 1999, at A16. 
8
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great effort, however, the Maori language has managed to survive 
as one of the primary weapons utilized in this fight.  Maori seek to 
nurture it just as the nation seeks to nurture the kiwi.46 
Maori is the foundation language of New Zealand, the 
ancestral language of the tangata whenua (people of the 
land) and one of the taonga (rights, property, anything 
highly prized). . . . Maori culture is part of the heritage of 
New Zealand, with the language at the heart of the 
culture.  To Maori, the language is taonga tuku iho (a gift 
handed down by their ancestors) and key to all things 
Maori.47 
Their language, however, was almost lost.  Between 1913 and 
1953 the number of Maori school children who could speak Maori 
decreased from 90% to 26%.  By 1998, only 8% of all Maori adults 
were fluent in it.  Their number is now increasing, however.48  In 
addition, thousands of Maori children are enrolled in Maori 
language schools,49 and the Maori Language Commission is looking 
for ways to encourage the learning of Maori.50  Since 1992, 24,000 
Pakeha children have also begun to learn Maori at school, 51 and 
certain Maori words are used regularly by non-Maori and in print.  
The Maori Language Act of 1987,52 which made Maori an official 
language, conveys the right to speak it in all legal proceedings, 
regardless of the ability to understand or communicate in English 
or any other language.53  Despite these strides, the language is 
retained at the margins by those New Zealanders who feel 
 
 46. Frankie Letford, Nurture Maori Language, N.Z. HERALD, July 19, 1999, at 
A12.  The kiwi is a nocturnal bird, unique to New Zealand.  New Zealanders have 
come to be called “Kiwis” because of this.  Neither is to be confused with the 
kiwifruit. 
 47. Richard Knight, Survival is Becoming a Race Against Time, N.Z. HERALD, 
June 1, 1999, at A15. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Richard Knight, New Vigour in Teaching Maori to People Gaining Second 
Language, N.Z. HERALD, July 26, 1999, at A11. Kohanga reo are preschools with 
Maori language as the main teaching language; and kura kaupapa are elementary 
and intermediate schools that teach traditional Maori values and conduct all 
lessons in Maori. Id.  Whare wananga are tertiary educational institutions with an 
emphasis on Maori language, but covering all ranges of subjects. Id. 
 50. Id.  The Government is utilizing both visual and oral techniques. Id. 
 51. Rawiri Taonui, Two Peoples, One Nation and Room for Optimism, N.Z. 
HERALD, Feb. 5, 1999, at A13. 
 52. Maori Language Act, 1987 (N.Z.). 
 53. Willie Jackson, Racism Behind Fury Over Anthem Sung in Maori, N.Z. 
HERALD, Oct. 15, 1999, at A15. 
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contempt toward it.54 
Other aspects of Maori culture that are highly visible to non-
Maori—such as the haka (chant),55 or historical displays at tourist 
sites—may be doing more to threaten the integrity of the culture 
than to preserve it and often fail to ameliorate the socio-economic 
conditions of Maori.56  For example, a recent movement to draw 
tourists to the markets, marae, and cultural performances of South 
Auckland, may do little to remedy the systemic nature of the 
renowned concentrated poverty embedded there.57 
Stephen Webster argues that the popular stereotype of Maori 
cultural identity actually subverts and obscures their struggle by 
protecting sources of power and avoiding real social change.58  This 
stereotype includes such characteristics as: 
[k]in [whanau] and community solidarity; respected and 
authoritative elders; public ceremonial and ritual 
symbolism in hui at marae (gatherings at kin-based 
meeting places including meeting-houses decorated with 
symbolic carvings, weavings, and paintings); generosity 
and sharing of resources; Maori language as mother 
tongue; harmony with the natural world; and profound 
spirituality centered in notions of tapu (‘taboo’), mana 
(‘prestige’), and wairua (‘spirit’).59 
Webster argues further that these characteristics often 
function in an essentialist way.  They are assumed to be “grounded 
primordially in tradition” and to describe “the whole way of life of 
contemporary Maori society, regardless of its struggles in a quite 
different daily political economic reality.” 60  Unfortunately, argues 
Webster, the cultural renaissance that has brought these characters 
to the attention of the nation has done little to change the 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. The haka is often performed before important sports matches by team 
members for inspiration. 
 56. Richard Knight, Authenticity Haunts Maori, N.Z. HERALD, June 7, 1999, at 
A15.  A survey of Te Arawa leaders from the popular tourist city Rotarua, 
suggested that some guides lied and that the exploitation of Maori culture 
degraded it. Id. But local operators say “history, scenery and authenticity all play 
an important role” and local elders help maintain the balance between success 
and staying true.  Id. 
 57. Nick Perry, Bright Lights of Otara to Beckon Tourist Dollars, N.Z. HERALD, July 
21, 1999, at A1.  The devastation of South Auckland was featured in the 1994 film, 
Once Were Warriors. 
 58. WEBSTER, supra note 22, at 21. 
 59. Id. at 29. 
 60. Id. 
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established structures and has left the majority of Maori largely 
unaffected.61  “There is ironic truth in the phrase, ‘I’m a born-again 
Maori’,” notes Webster, in that any change likely to come about 
from this cultural momentum is likely to be “individual, 
psychological, or spiritual.”62 
The other side of Maori culture is more real: 
[T]he insistent assertion of ignorance of Maori culture . . . 
black wool singlets, gumboots, and acrid sweat of forestry, 
shearing, and slaughterhouse gangs; two street 
maintenance workers leaning on shovels and watching a 
third dig around a water main; young unemployed eyes 
gazing expressionlessly from under a baggy stocking cap; 
battered women nevertheless staunch in standing up for 
their men; chain-smoking unto death; defiantly sprawling 
graffiti asserting that ‘Maoridom is boredom’; street-kid 
‘homies’ sleeping in derelict buildings; the shapeless 
threat of a motorcycle gang in the park; Black Power 
living in the midst of a ‘traditional’ Maori community; a 
Maori haka or war dance done not by a rugby team, but by 
the inmates of a gaol; the laconic denial by an inmate 
tattooist that Maori motifs might be in need of the expert 
advice of Maori elders; every TV screen tuned in to a 
Maori motif flown on the spinnaker of the Bank of New 
Zealand yacht in the America’s Cup race; a jagged scar 
where a piece is torn from the sacrosanct carving in the 
Maori meeting-house of a university most Maori can never 
hope to enter.63 
Paul Meredith of Waikato University agrees with Webster that 
the nation must abandon its romantic notions of “the authentic 
‘Maori’” or “the innocent essential ‘Maori’ subject.”64  Drawing 
upon Stuart Hall’s work with “black” as a category, Meredith rejects 
fixed, transcendental racial categories.  Instead he favors an 
understanding of “Maori” as a politically and culturally constructed 
category that can account for a complex plurality of “Maori” 
subjects.65 
 
 61. Id. at 33. 
 62. Id. at 39. 
 63. Id. at 49. 
 64. Paul Meredith, Seeing the “Maori Subject”: Some Discussion Points, 
Paper Presented at the 10th Annual General Meeting of The “Maori” Law Society 3 
(1998).  Meredith is of Ngati Kaputui and Pakeha origins. [transcript of speech 
available with author]. 
 65. Meredith, supra note 64, at 3 (citing STUART HALL, DAVID MORLEY & KUAN-
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According to Meredith, prior to the arrival of Pakehas, the 
word maori meant “normal” or “usual”.  There was no one 
dominant Maori identity.  Instead, community members were 
defined by whanau, iwi, and the surrounding terrain.66  Only when 
the tangata whenua (people of the land) contrasted so starkly with 
Pakeha did a common ethnicity emerge.  Early missionaries pushed 
this new Maori identity through conversion and sought an end to 
tribal distinctions.  This colonization process, along with later 
urbanization and immigration, has lead some Maori to adopt a 
pan-Maori identity.67  However, argues Meredith, to be Maori is to 
be more than one essential thing, it is to have a gender, class, 
political orientation, religious preference, sexual orientation, 
etc. . . . 68  To essentialize Maoriness is to facilitate the ongoing 
colonial project of acculturation, pragmatism, and expedience.69 
Fostering an anti-essentialist understanding of Maori in New 
Zealand requires an examination of the two most embracing 
structural contexts in which their experience(s) unfold: the Treaty 
of Waitangi and the recent neo-liberal economic reform. 
B.  Te Tiriti o Waitangi—The Treaty of Waitangi 
1.  Historical Foundations of the Treaty 
[The] Maori protest has kept the treaty alive more than 
any other single factor.  It has challenged the long-
standing assumption that the treaty forged ‘one people’ 
and that New Zealand was a special experiment in 
relationships between a European and an indigenous 
people. . . .  In many respects New Zealand, in spite of the 
treaty, has been merely a variation in the pattern of 
colonial domination of indigenous races.70 
— Claudia Orange, Historian 
According to legend, Polynesians first arrived in this South 
Pacific group of islands in the 10th century naming it Aotearoa, 
“land of the Long White Cloud,” although archaeological evidence 
 
HSING CHEN, STUART HALL: CRITICAL DIALOGUES IN CULTURAL STUDIES (1996). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 4. 
 68. Id. at 5. 
 69. Id. at 8-9. For this reason, references to the experience(s) of Maori are 
made in the optional plural form throughout this article. 
 70. CLAUDIA ORANGE, THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 5 (1987). 
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suggests settlements existing as far back as 700 B.C.71  The early 
Maori social system was based on kinship, chiefly leadership, and a 
shared language and belief system based on mana and tapu.  After 
Captain Cook’s three exploratory voyages, British frontiers of trade 
and Christianity turned toward Aotearoa.  Beginning in 1800, naval 
and commercial vessels exploited resources regularly.  By the mid-
1830s semi-permanent trader-settlers established themselves along 
the coast, increasing to over 2000 permanent settlers by 1839.72 
Initial Maori-Pakeha contact proved mutually advantageous.  
Maori traded their services and provisions for European trade 
goods, and Europeans proceeded to extract the natural products of 
the land. Once subsistence farmers and food-gatherers, Maori 
began cultivating crops for trade and learning to read and write in 
Maori.  Some became Christian or integrated it into Maori ritenga 
(custom).  Change was more rapid along the coast of the North 
Island, while the inland and South Island remained largely 
unaffected until the 1830s. 73  By then an increasing number of 
redcoats, settler militia, and kupapa auxiliaries (Maori 
collaborators) were confiscating Maori lands and undermining 
their iwi organizations.  When Maori tried to acquire the skills 
needed to conform, they found themselves trapped in a legal 
jungle that made it  difficult to develop, but easy to sell, their 
lands.74 
Consequently, Maori appealed to the British Crown for 
protection.75 As historian Claudia Orange argues, “All parties who 
expressed an interest in New Zealand . . . shared the conviction 
that British intervention was both necessary and desirable.  
Opinion differed only on the extent . . . and the role that the Maori 
people should play.  It was now a question of whose interests were 
to come first . . . .”76  In 1835, at the urging of concerned 
missionaries, thirty-four rangatira (chiefs) signed a Declaration of 
Sovereignty, asking the British Crown to be a parent and protector 
of their independent infant state.  Ironically, the Crown viewed this 
 
 71. KING, supra note 4, at 9. 
 72. ORANGE, supra note 70, at 6. 
 73. Id. at 7. 
 74. ALAN WARD, AN UNSETTLED HISTORY 4 (1999). 
 75. ORANGE, supra note 70, at 11-12. They first appealed in 1830 after “The 
Elizabeth Affair” when an English captain conspired with the Ngati Toa of Kapiti to 
raid the Ngai Tahu of The South Island, and then again in 1831 when rumors 
circulated that a French warship intended to annex Aotearoa.  Id. 
 76. Id. at 26. 
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document as the means by which to make the Aotearoa a 
dependency and later a Protectorate, prompting it to consider 
negotiating a treaty that would secure the right to pass laws.77  
Although it was rare for colonizers to negotiate rights with the 
indigenous populations, the Maori were more militarily and 
economically organized than other populations Britain 
encountered. 78 
In 1840, the Treaty of Waitangi was drafted by the British and 
presented to the Maori in a manner calculated to secure their 
agreement.  The transfer of power to the Crown was downplayed 
and Maori suspicions lulled by the assurance of a degree of 
rangatiratanga (sovereignty) and the extension of law, order, 
protection, and other rights.79  There were actually two treaties—
one in English and one in Maori (with its subsequent English 
translation).  Because of this, the exact meaning of the Treaty was 
uncertain.  As Orange describes it: 
Confusion surrounded the treaty from the first.  The 
treaty in English ceded to Britain the sovereignty of New 
Zealand and gave the Crown an exclusive right of pre-
emption of such lands as the Maori people wished to sell.  
In return, the Maori were guaranteed full rights of 
ownership of their lands, forests, fisheries and other 
prized possessions [taonga].  The treaty also promised 
them the rights and privileges of British subjects, together 
with assurances of Crown protection.  Only thirty-nine 
chiefs signed this treaty in the English language, however.  
Most signed a treaty in the Maori language.  The text 
failed to convey the meaning of the English version, and 
the treaty negotiations did not clarify the difference.  Each 
party to the treaty was left with expectations about the 
power they would exercise.80 
To the British, the Treaty cleared away a legal impediment to 
assertion of British sovereignty, answered contemporary 
humanitarian interests to ‘protect’ native races, and secured Maori 
co-operation as a basis for peaceful European settlement.81  It also 
 
 77. Id. at 21; Sir Douglas Graham, Declaration of Sovereignty was Superseded By 
Treaty, N.Z. HERALD, Feb. 22, 1999, at A13. 
 78. KEN S. COATES & P.G. MCHUGH, LIVING RELATIONSHIPS, KOKIRI NGATAHI: 
THE TREATY OF WAITANGI IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 30 (1998). 
 79. ORANGE, supra note 70, at 32-33. 
 80. Id. at 1. 
 81. Id. at 2. 
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served to curtail French expansion in the Pacific, and regulate 
privately owned, opportunistic land settlement companies.82 
Although there was no single Maori understanding of the 
Treaty, Rawiri Taonui, lecturer in history at the University of 
Auckland, argues that it was viewed as an “honourable pact 
between themselves and the new arrivals.” 83  Despite this 
understanding, an outbreak of fighting in the 1850s over land, 
authority, and rangatiratanga required Britain to secure sovereignty 
on the battlefield and in the colonial parliament, where they had 
gained it in name only.  Despite these tensions, a major hui 
(meeting) of rangatira was held near Auckland in the 1860s to 
clarify the Treaty’s clauses and serve as a Maori ‘ratification.’  
Again, because the Crown presented the Treaty in its most 
benevolent light, Maori leaders came away viewing it as a primarily 
protective, religious-like covenant that left their mana intact. 84 
By the 1860s, however, Britain was systematically suppressing 
the Maori.  A new translation of the Treaty clarified the official 
meaning: Maori had signed away sovereignty of the country in 1840 
and there was neither a cause for separate governmental 
institutions, nor a basis for alleging the abridgment of any 
enumerated rights.85  The newly formed settler government, which 
now had substantial control, “assumed full responsibility over and 
subjugated the Maori, perpetrated a series of unjust wars, 
confiscated and/or forced Maori to sell vast tracts of land, and 
passed immoral legislation.”86  As a result, the Maori were deprived 
of the most basic rights.87 
Nonetheless, Maori still believed Treaty promises were going 
to be honored, directing hundreds of petitions to the government 
and protesting to England.88  These petitions, along with early 
protests over land in the 1880s, forced the government to publicly 
 
 82. Taonui, supra note 51, at A13. 
 83. Id.  However, the reality of colonization and suppression belied this 
impression.  For example, after the Treaty, Maori were detained without trial and 
banned from speaking their language in schools. 
 84. ORANGE, supra note 70, at 4. 
 85. Id. at 3. 
 86. Taonui, supra note 51, at A13.  Lands were first taken through 
confiscations pursuant to the New Zealand Settlements Act, 1863 (N.Z.), then 
through the Native Land Court under the Native Land Act, 1865 (N.Z.).  Seas and 
waterways were also taken through legislation such as the Oyster Fisheries Act, 
1867 (N.Z.). 
 87. Id. 
 88. ORANGE, supra note 70, at 4. 
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dismiss the Treaty.  Some representatives even claimed that Captain 
Cook’s discovery was the actual basis for the assertion of 
sovereignty.89  By 1900, the economic, cultural and political 
suppression of the Maori was substantially complete 90 and by 1930 
less than 6% of original lands remained in their hands, most of it 
impossible to farm.91  This loss of land led to a loss of 
rangatiratanga—“the capacity for self-determination which can only 
come with control over resources.” 92  The Treaty would not receive 
official prominence again until the centenary approached in 1940 
and Pakeha were seeking symbols to express their budding 
nationhood.93 
One of the first symbols to emerge was the Treaty House, the 
site of the original Treaty signing in the Northland.  When the 
house was gifted to the nation in 1934, it quickly revived the Treaty 
as an icon of the nation’s identity.  The Treaty was subsequently 
promoted, alongside what Taonui describes as the “fiction of racial 
harmony in New Zealand,” while “the real history of injustice was 
laid aside.”94 
But Maori continued to petition the Government and the 
British Crown for relief.95  And in the 1970s, when a recession 
further marginalized and urbanized Maori, the educated Maori 
elite began to organize to reject assimilation and minority status 
and to secure “first occupants” rights under the Treaty.  Protests 
and direct action began to dominate Maori-Pakeha relations.  Land 
occupations were particularly successful, the most renowned of 
which was of Bastion Point, one of the few remaining areas held by 
Maori in Auckland.96  Pakeha were taken by surprise.  They believed 
 
 89. ORANGE, supra note 70, at 3-4. William Fox, a veteran colonial politician, 
wrote a lengthy exposition claiming the Treaty was an invalid basis for the 
assertion of sovereignty. Id. at 3. 
 90. Taonui, supra note 51. 
 91. WARD, supra note 74, at 4. 
 92. Id. at 6. 
 93. ORANGE, supra note 70, at  3-4; Taonui, supra note 51, at A13. 
 94. Taonui, supra note 51, at A13. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Rawiri Taonui, Bastion Point Evictions: Only Now is the Real Story Told, N.Z. 
HERALD, June 29, 1999, at A13.  The government had been (mis)using this area 
and one other Maori holdout, Okahu Bay, for positioning guns (it was thought the 
Russians might invade in the 1850s) and later for such projects as sewage lines—
although Maori homes remained unconnected.  Maori were refused building 
permits and then labeled backward and blamed for the destitution.  Their homes 
and a marae were even burned in the 1950s to prepare for the Queen’s visit.  When 
the government planned to subdivide Bastion Point, the Nagati Whatua people 
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that Maori already enjoyed equal rights and that New Zealand was 
different from other countries such as America or South Africa.97 
As a result of these protests, the Treaty of Waitangi Act of 
197598 created the Waitangi Tribunal to hear Maori claims of Treaty 
breaches.99  Along with amendments such as the Treaty of Waitangi 
Amendment Act of 1985,100 which allows for historical claims going 
back to 1840, this legislation provides Maori due process for 
seeking reparations and restoring rangatiratanga.101  As might be 
expected, however, the Crown102 controls all major Treaty 
organizations such as the Tribunal and the Office of Treaty 
Settlements.  The Tribunal, which has the most Maori input, is also 
the least powerful and chronically lacks adequate funding.  It can 
make findings about the validity of claims and recommend 
compensation, but only subsequent Crown or court opinions can 
render these findings binding.103  Approximately half of the 
Tribunal’s recommendations have been ignored by the 
government and some have yielded negative outcomes, which 
Maori have contested.104 
As of 1999, the New Zealand Crown had paid  $600 million105 
in compensation to Maori106 and there were approximately 790 
claims still remaining before the Tribunal.107  Some argue that all 
historical claims can be settled within a couple of decades, but that 
the Tribunal will always be needed for the resolution of current 
 
rose up and occupied the land.  In the late 1980s, a $3 million settlement was 
reached.  The Ngati Whatua now have land elsewhere and lucrative development 
projects. Id. 
 97. WARD, supra note 74, at 22. 
 98. Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975 (N.Z.). 
 99. Taonui, supra note 51, at A13; WARD, supra note 74, at 7. 
 100. Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985 (N.Z.). 
 101. WARD, supra note 74, at 25.  Other amendments extended due process in 
relation to State-owned Enterprise land and Crown forestry land. 
 102. “Crown” will hereinafter be used in reference to the New Zealand 
government. 
 103. Rawiri Taonui, Treaty Negotiations: Act with Patience, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 7, 
1999, at A17.  The Tribunal has some power to compulsorily return state-owned 
enterprise lands and crown forests but has only threatened to use this power once. 
Id. 
 104. Paul Spoonley, A Long Way to Go Before All Maori Issues Are Settled, N.Z. 
HERALD, Dec. 3, 1999, at A15.  Much Maori controversy is between rural iwi and 
urban Maori or between iwi and hapu (subtribes). 
 105. All references to dollar amounts refer to the New Zealand dollar. 
 106. Taonui, supra note 51, at A13. 
 107. Spoonley, supra note 104, at A15. 
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issues.108  Others, like Richard Pribble, leader of the political party, 
ACT, have called for the abolishment of the Tribunal and the final 
settlement of all claims within the next decade.109 
2.  Current Treaty Claims 
I say to Maoridom: ‘Mandate your people and get on to 
negotiate. Get out of the courts and into the [negotiating] 
room so we can negotiate these things with ministers and 
make progress.’110 
— Jenny Shipley, National Party Prime Minister, 1999 
Current Treaty claims assume many forms and illustrate the 
limitations of the claims process.111 
a.  Land Claims 
Land claims are the most common.  For example, the 
Muriwhenua (Far North) Land Claim, one of the first to be lodged, 
has yet to be settled.  The difficulty lies in uniting five iwi and 30 
separate claims in one settlement.112  Bitter inter-iwi disputes over 
who has the mandate to represent them in negotiations, and how 
settlement and compensation distribution processes will be 
handled have caused lengthy delays.113  A recently formed joint 
negotiating team has faltered,114 and the Director of the Tribunal 
has called for an independent, well-resourced, culturally 
appropriate body to deal with treaty claim settlement disputes.115 
 
 108. WARD, supra note 74, at 167. 
 109. Spoonley, supra note 104, at A15. See also Courage is Priority for Treaty Pact, 
SUNDAY STAR TIMES, Oct. 3, 1999, at A10. 
 110. John Armstrong, Shipley Urges Treaty Action, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 1, 1999, at 
A5. 
 111. This is not to suggest that all settlements are disappointing.  The Ngai 
Tahu have been particularly successful in balancing economic development with 
bettering the welfare of the iwi and its members.  Even though they accepted a 
settlement at a fraction of their loss, they have been able to buy Crown assets and 
develop subsidiary investments, particularly tourism.  Improvements include a 
stronger economic base, increased job opportunities, housing development, and 
scholarships and grants for tertiary education.  The government controlled Trust 
Board has even been replaced with a regionally-elected organization. Richard 
Knight, Tribe Eyes Court Over Land Loss, N.Z. HERALD, May 11, 1999, at A5. 
 112. Jan Corbett and James Gardiner, Tribal Infighting Stalls Claim, N.Z. 
HERALD, Aug. 23-24, 1999, at A15. 
 113. Tony Gee, Move on Our Claim Before Election: Iwi, N.Z. HERALD, Sep. 11, 
1999, at A10. 
 114. Minister Accused of Divide-and-Rule Ploy, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 5, 1999, at A8. 
 115. Richard Knight, Tribal Infighting Spurs Disputes Service Plan, N.Z. HERALD, 
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More recently, the Crown settled a land claim with a Turangi 
hapu (subtribe) for the taking of land under compulsory order in 
1964 to support a power scheme. 116  The Tribunal found that the 
Crown took more land than it said it would and broke its promise 
to lease it back.117  In addition to $5 million compensation in cash 
and properties, the Crown also deeded the Turangitukua House, a 
site of cultural significance, to the hapu.118  However, management 
and control of some of the reserves remain with the area district 
council rather than with Maori, who accuse the Crown of not 
trusting them to manage their own land.119 
Land claims settlements have also been troubled by the 
perceived importance of the disputed land to the “nation as a 
whole”—writ Pakeha.  Claims that Maori rangatira (chiefs) were 
deceived into signing away part of the capital city, Wellington, 
could result in nearly $10 billion compensation.120  The 
mythologically significant Whanganui River121 has also been subject 
to a claim.122  In 1999, after nearly 120 years of advocacy, the 
Tribunal recommended the river be vested with the Atihaunui 
people and the Whanganui River Maori Trust Board be given 
management power over uses of the waterway.123  Critics are 
worried about the precedent, however.  As one MP (member of 
parliament) puts it, “everything, including air, water and sunlight 
together with the ownership of all native plants and animals in New 
 
Feb. 10, 1999, at A12. 
 116. Treaty Deal Will Return to Haunt Government Say MPs, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 7, 
1999, at A12.  Some even think that the land should be handed back to 
descendants of the original owners.  Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Maori May be Entitled to Wellington, N.Z. HERALD, April 1, 1999, at A6.  This 
claim was recently reinforced by historical evidence discovered from a New 
Zealand Company land purchase officer. 
 121. Rawiri Taonui, Sacred River Much More than Just a Waterway, N.Z. HERALD, 
July 5, 1999, at A13.  In mythology, the Whanganui River valley is the rift left by 
Maunga (Mount) Taranaki when he fled to the west after losing a battle with 
Maunga Tongariro over the love of Maunga Pihanga. Id.  Water flowing from a 
wound in Tongariro’s side formed the river. Id.  The river is a living entity of the 
Atihaunui. Id.  It is their ancestor, their kin-relation and the living embodiment of 
all that they are. Id. 
 122. Id.  The Atihaunui people lost 1.3 million acres and water flow when the 
river was diverted into a power scheme. Id. 
 123. Eugene Bingham, Tour Operators Display Grasp of ‘Spirituality,’ N.Z. 
HERALD, June 28, 1999, at A3. 
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Zealand is now up for grabs.”124 
b.  Fishing Rights Claims 
Indeed, recent claims are not limited to land.  Several 
thousand Maori from the Far North planned to file a claim in 1999 
when the government threatened to remove the moratorium on 
permits for commercial harvesting of seaweed.125  More 
importantly, many claims have been lodged to secure fisheries 
rights after British colonization destroyed what was an extensive 
Maori fishing industry.126 
The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission was established 
in 1992 as part of the Sealord deal, “in which Maori relinquished 
commercial fishing rights in return for quota, cash and shares in 
the fishing company.”127  The Commission is responsible for 
sharing out Maori fishing assets which it has successfully increased 
from an initial $190 million to $600 million.  Although it tries to 
ensure that all Maori benefit from the assets and has even set up a 
help-line to assist people in learning which tribe they belong to, 128 
the Commission has faced court action ten times because of its 
procedure for allocating fishing rights to different Maori groups.129  
Because only mandated iwi organizations have the right to deal 
with the Commission, litigation to identify who actually possesses 
 
 124. Audrey Young, Precedent a Worry, Says Act MP, N.Z. HERALD, June 28, 1999, 
at A3.  For example, the foreshore, seabed and water of the Hauraki Gulf around 
Auckland are subject to a complaint asking for a 50% management role in a 
proposed marine park. Richard Knight, Maori Demand More Say on Marine Park, 
N.Z. HERALD, July 15, 1999, at A18. 
 125. Richard Knight, Maori Lodge Seaweed Plea, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 2, 1999, at 
A18.  Seaweed is a traditional food and medicine source for Maori. 
 126. Alison Horwood, Onus on Maori to Care for Fisheries: O’Regan, N.Z. HERALD, 
Oct. 13, 1999, at A13. 
 127. Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claim) Settlement Act, 1992 (N.Z.); Richard 
Knight, Fisheries Anger Brings Threat of More Litigation, N.Z. HERALD, July 24-25, 
1999, at A5. 
 128. Whaimutu Dewes, Time for Fishing Assets to Go to Traditional Maori Tribes, 
N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 22, 1999, at A13. The Commission works out of two premises: 
the collective nature of the property requires allocation through iwis; and all 
Maori must benefit from the settlement.  Id.  Iwis, in return, must act for benefit of 
all their members. Id. Whether assets should be distributed on the basis of 
population or as property rights to tribes with a fishing tradition is still contested.  
The Tribunal, however, has confirmed Ngai Tahu’s rights to claim the fisheries off 
their coast because their rohe (boundary) takes in the majority of the South Island.  
MELBOURNE, supra note 10, at 156. 
 129. Richard Knight, Constant Litigation Leaves Fish Body to Flounder in Legal Net, 
N.Z. HERALD, April 13, 1999, at A11. 
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this mandate continues.  The result is confusion between Maori 
and non-Maori and problems not only for fishery assets, but for the 
claims process as a whole.130  Matters are further complicated by 
urban Maori authorities who have demanded they be taken into 
account.  Their quest to be designated as an iwi with rights to the 
distribution of assets has largely failed in the courts.131  In response, 
the Minister of Maori Affairs in mid-1999, Tau Henere, called for 
the reconstitution of the Commission to include urban Maori 
representatives, which traditional iwi opposed.132 
c.  Other Claims 
Other Treaty claims include demanding the continuation of 
the Maori news service on national radio,133 achieving greater Maori 
control of the New Zealand Film Commission,134 and participating 
in radio wave auctions—all three of which focus on issues of access 
to resources to advance the Maori language and culture.  In the 
case of radio waves, in 1999, the Tribunal found that the Crown 
had failed to consult Maori about the sale of the nation’s airwaves 
as required under the Treaty. 135  It called for damages and for 
Maori participation in any future auction of radio waves, whether 
for data, radio, or television.136  The Tribunal’s recommendations 
sparked heated debate.  Neither Maori nor Pakeha knew of the 
electromagnetic spectrum in 1840, so was the Tribunal “stretching 
its credibility” when it found the Crown guilty of an “‘aggravated 
breach’ of the Treaty?”137  Was it overstepping its scope of operation 
by offering Maori “a free ride” for any asset they could think of?138  
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.  In 1999, urban Maori asked Justice Paterson in the High Court at 
Auckland to decide what constituted an iwi.  His decision was that urban 
authorities had no claim on assets.  The Appeals Court rejected their case against 
allocating fishing assets through tribes (iwis). Dewes, supra note 128. 
 132. Knight, supra note 127.  
 133. Richard Knight, End of Maori Radio News Attacked as Treaty Breach, N.Z. 
HERALD, July 9, 1999, at A14.  Three daily news bulletins were stopped in early July 
1999. Id. 
 134. Louisa Cleave, Maori Seek Bigger Role in Film Commission, N.Z. HERALD, Feb. 
15, 1999, at A4.  Maori film-makers have lodged a claim with the Waitangi 
Tribunal for greater control over the Commission and its $12 million annual 
budget which is the main source of funding for the film industry.  Id. 
 135. Keith Newman & Keith Perry, Maori Victory in Radio Battle, N.Z. HERALD, 
July 1, 1999, at A1. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Bizarre Treaty Judgment, N.Z. HERALD, July 2, 1999, at A10. 
 138. Reuben Chapple, Radio Spectrum Belongs to Whole Country, Not a Race, N.Z. 
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Or was the Tribunal correct in interpreting the Treaty to require a 
sharing of “the then known resources and, by implication, those 
resources that would subsequently become available?”139  At the 
heart of this debate was whether the Treaty was meant “to fossilize 
the status quo” or to function as a “living instrument to be applied 
in light of developing circumstances.”140  In the end, the 
Government rejected the Tribunal’s recommendations and 
resumed plans to auction the radiowaves.141 
Alan Ward, a contract historian with the Waitangi Tribunal, 
suggests that to overcome the limitations of the Treaty claims 
process the Crown should strengthen and racially balance the 
Tribunal; develop national reparation guidelines and models for 
research; and provide incentives for claimant groups to aggregate 
their claims and work together.142  These suggestions, however, 
leave without remedy the lack of attention paid to rangatiratanga or 
sovereignty. 
3.  The Treaty and Rangatiratanga 
[T]wo pegs have been set in the ground. 143  
— Wira Gardiner, Former Executive Director of the 
Ministry of Maori Development  
We should be cautious with straightforward sovereignty 
claims of either the Crown or Maori . . . . The challenge is 
to accept a bit of both . . . [but] can there be a blending 
of two cultures if one of them tells the other how to do 
it?144   
— Klaus Bosselman, law lecturer, University of Auckland 
 
HERALD, July 19, 1999, at A13. 
 139. Rawiri Taonui, Airwaves: Maori Entitled to ‘Fair, Equitable’ Share, N.Z. 
HERALD, July 12, 1999, at A13.  Critics even feared claims would now be made on 
everything “from genetic engineering discoveries to oil and gas reserves.” Andrew 
Laxon & Keith Perry, Government Cool on Airwaves Decision: Access to Knowledge the 
Issue, N.Z. HERALD, July 2, 1999, at A3. 
 140. Ron Taylor, Does Finding Mean a New Edition of Treaty, N.Z. HERALD, July 3-
4, 1999, at A19; Tanoui, supra note 139, at A13. 
 141. Angela Gregory, Boilover with Maori Brews Over Radio Spectrum Sale, N.Z. 
HERALD, Oct. 21, 1999, at A2. Elders of the largest Maori tribe protested and 
planned to appeal to the courts and to the Privy Council in Britain. Id. 
 142. WARD, supra note 74, at 176-78. 
 143. MELBOURNE, supra note 10, at 82. 
 144. Klaus Bosselmann, Two Cultures Will Become One Only on Equal Terms, N.Z. 
HERALD, March. 1, 1999, at A13. 
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a.  Article II Rights 
In Article II of the Maori version of the Treaty of Waitangi, the 
Queen gives Maori “tino rangatiratanga” or “full sovereignty” over 
their lands, villages and taonga (precious possessions).  In the 
English version, however, the Queen gives them merely 
“undisturbed possession.”  Understanding what exactly was given 
and what bearing it should have today is critical to national 
discourse and identity. 
At an undiscerning level, the two versions of the Treaty are 
pitted against each other.  Many Maori argue that the Treaty 
created a partnership to govern the country and that Maori did not 
cede rangatiratanga in 1840.145  Many Pakeha, on the other hand, 
argue that reference to the Treaty as a partnership is misleading.  
As Sir Douglas Graham, the minister in charge of Treaty 
negotiations states: 
Once the Treaty had been confirmed, sovereignty as it is 
commonly understood, passed from Maori to Britain.  If 
Maori are still sovereign, . . . then Maori have effectively 
terminated the treaty and have no rights under it.  They 
cannot have it both ways . . . . [The Treaty] certainly did 
not create a partnership to govern the country . . . . That 
function passed to the Crown.146 
Graham asks what Maori sovereignty would actually look like if 
conceded. Would it give Maori the right to pass laws binding on all 
New Zealanders or just on Maoris?  Would all Maori be subject 
somehow to Maori-generated laws but no others?  Would Maori 
living in Auckland be subject to laws that are different to those 
applying to the non-Maori living next door?  Obviously Graham 
believes sovereignty wouldn’t work: “New Zealand is quite different 
to Canada [and the United States], where Indians enjoy limited 
self-government on reservations. Here Maori do not lie on 
reservations—they are fully integrated.”147  Once the claims process 
is complete, Graham concludes, Maori will have the chance “to join 
the rest of us” and “work towards a united, peaceful country rather 
 
 145. Lynette Waymouth, No Ceding of Sovereignty, N.Z. HERALD, Feb. 26, 1999, at 
A13. Waymouth argues that a series of articles and editorials in Te Wananga, a 
Maori newspaper from 1874-1878 support this position. Id. Also, the Maori 
Council has had plans to lobby APEC countries to recognize Maori sovereignty. 
Graham, supra note 77. 
 146. Graham, supra note 77, at A13. 
 147. Id. 
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than promote separatism and division.”148 
At a more discerning level, Wayne Rumbles of the University of 
Waikato School of Law criticizes the claims process for functioning 
as a “mask” that excuses the white public “from taking 
responsibility for its own racism and colonialism”149 and for 
perpetuating the old relationship of colonizer and colonized.  The 
Crown determines who will come to the table, what is to be 
negotiated, and how.  This protects the construction of a unitary 
sovereignty and displaces claims for rangatiratanga under Article II.  
Rumbles argues that this type of postcolonial practice and 
discourse in white settler countries is dangerous.  It embraces 
diversity without addressing the institutional and constitutional 
basis of the colonial societies, which in turn re-inscribes the 
colonization process.  “Maori are expected to settle for less than 2% 
of the value of their claims, to agree to extinguish all historical 
grievances . . . and then state that the settlement is fair, full and 
final. . . . The Treaty Settlement process is not fair and reasonable, 
and the Crown is acting to maintain its privileged position. . . .” 150 
This masking process works in the following way.  First, it 
removes rangatiratanga from the negotiating table altogether.  As, 
Jim Bolger, the 1995 Prime Minister of New Zealand bluntly stated, 
“We can not negotiate the division of sovereignty between various 
groups of New Zealanders.  That is not possible and won’t 
happen.”151  Next, the masking process removes ethnicity from the 
table, removing the “Maoriness from Maori, both textually . . . and 
institutionally.”152  For example, the word “Maori” is found only 
once in the Direct Negotiation Booklet where the phrase “claimant 
group” is preferred.  More importantly the Crown remains in 
control of the process, while at the same time backgrounding the 
unequal power relationship. The entire process serves an 
assimilative purpose and allows for the denial of “Otherness,” 
claims Rumbles.153 
The “corporatization of the iwi” as Rumbles describes it, has a 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Wayne Rumbles, Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Process: New Relationship 
or New Mask, Paper Presented at The Compr(om)ising Post/Colonialism 
Conference 3 (Feb. 10-13, 1999) available at Te Matahauariki Institute, 
http://www.lianz.waikato.ac.nz/. 
 150. Id. at 13. 
 151. Id. at 9. 
 152. Id. at 10. 
 153. Id. at 9-10. 
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similar assimilative effect. Structuring the management of 
settlements through corporate organizations “allows Pakeha to see 
Maori in terms of their own culture without having to 
accommodate counter-hegemonic tribal power structures.”154  It 
also causes difficulty among Maori powerbrokers and those seeking 
rangatiratanga: 
As has been shown in fisheries settlements among 
American Indians, the structure of the settlement itself 
creates class differences which fit the indigenous people 
more closely into the capitalist structure of the society . . . 
[and] neutralizes the ethnic solidarity which forced the 
settlement. . . . [T]he new share of wealth will go to 
‘tribes’ which are, in effect, capitalist corporations run by 
a managerial Maori elite.155 
Building upon this division, the masking process also fosters a 
“Good Maori-Bad Maori” dichotomy. Those who settle, claims 
Rumbles, are admired as reasonable, sensible, realistic, 
reconstituted, postcolonial, post-settlement and capitalist.  This 
helps Pakeha see Maori in terms of their own culture. On the other 
hand, those who don’t settle are seen as unreasonable and 
unrealistic.  This dichotomy eventually becomes internalized and 
seen as natural—hiding the reality of the imbalance in 
negotiations.156 
To unmask the Treaty settlement discourse and practice, 
Graham recommends several measures: viewing the claims process 
as an interim measure to help recreate an economic base for Maori 
rather than a full and final solution; exposing the fiction of a 
unitary Crown sovereignty; and placing the discussion of Maori 
rangatiratanga squarely on the negotiating table “. . . in a fair and 
equitable manner and not circumscribed by an unwillingness to 
deconstruct [the nation’s] colonial infrastructure and power 
relationships, which are based on a fiction of unitary sovereignty.”157 
b.  Indigenous Rights 
This movement away from unitary notions of sovereignty is 
also reflected in international discourse supporting indigenous 
rights.  In the last fifty years, international pressures have mounted 
 
 154. Id. at 11. 
 155. WEBSTER, supra note 22, at 38. 
 156. Rumbles, supra note 149, at 11-13. 
 157. Id. at 14. 
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to resolve the grievances of indigenous peoples dispossessed of 
their land and culture by paternalistic settler populations.158  
Almost all demand sovereignty.  As stated in the U.N. Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 1994, Article 3, 
“Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination.  By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”159 
Klaus Bosselmann, law lecturer at the University of Auckland, 
argues that Maori rangatiratanga has a sound legal basis under this 
emerging post-colonial international law.  State sovereignty is no 
longer absolute but must be considered along with self-
determination and human rights.  “Accordingly, a concept of ‘joint 
government’ based on the Treaty as a ‘partnership’ and 
rangatiratanga as the exercise of self-government is ‘a distinct legal 
option.’”160  Bosselmann describes a relationship that allows for 
both territorial sovereignty of the Crown and joint government of 
Pakeha and Maori.  He argues that a second chamber in 
parliament and a Maori legal system would be legitimate and would 
not threaten the nation’s sovereignty.  An equitably negotiated 
written constitution, however, would offer the opportunity to settle 
the debate.161 
Legal scholars Ken S. Coates and P.G. McHugh also endorse 
this relational approach to indigenous rights for two main reasons.  
First, they fear that a claims-based relationship between 
government and tribe produce only interim results rather than an 
 
 158. COATES & MCHUGH, supra note 78, at 20.  Progress has been made by the 
Small Peoples of the North in Yakutia (central Siberia in Russia), the First Nations 
of the Yukon, and the Inuvialiut of the Mackenzie River basin. Id. at 21.  The 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d. 
Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), provided a vital international forum for 
indigenous rights.  1993 was declared International Year of the Worlds’ 
Indigenous People; many support groups subsequently emerged (World Council 
of Indigenous People; Survival International, Centre for World Indigenous 
Studies); in 1982 the Working Group on Indigenous Populations was established 
and released the Draft Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 34 I.L.M. 541, 
548 (1995), affirming and extending the rights of indigenous peoples.  Self-
determination is central.  It requires protection from genocide; guarantees 
cultural and intellectual property rights; and requires existing treaties to be 
honored.  It is heatedly debated.  If ratified by the U.S., New Zealand or  Canada, 
it would lead to internal legal challenges, increased non-indigenous anxiety, and 
political conflict. COATES & MCHUGH, supra note 78, at 21-39. 
 159. 34 I.L.M. 541, 548 (1995).  This right is also referred to in various human 
rights conventions and other international agreements. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Bosselmann, supra note 144. 
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ongoing framework for that very relationship.  The resolution of 
one claim simply provides the basis for another.162  Second, they 
fear that because indigenous rights are western constructs that fail 
to reflect the cultures and belief systems of indigenous people (e.g., 
individual land ownership vs. communal connections with physical 
surroundings), they must be superseded by a post-structuralist 
approach in which identity arises and relations are managed.163 
A post-structuralist approach, argues McHugh, avoids the 
appropriation of the dominant culture that results from pitting the 
rights of the state against those of the tribe.164  “It emphasizes a 
process and voice as well as continuity and negotiability of identity 
and relations rather than illusory and rigid notions of closure and 
exit.”165  As a result, a post-structuralist approach leads to a 
cooperative cultural coexistence void of the politics of 
domination.166  Interestingly, McHugh sees the United States as an 
emergent model of this approach, displaying growing emphasis at a 
federal level upon native consent and cooperation—a “bottom-up” 
rather than “top-down” approach.167  McHugh argues that any 
agreement—even to talk—is an exercise of sovereignty.168 
From a distance (McHugh is now teaching at Cambridge) it 
looks like New Zealand is moving toward a “relational” approach 
through the Treaty claims process. McHugh states that “what 
 
 162. P.G. McHugh, Aboriginal Identity and Relations in North America and 
Australia, in LIVING RELATIONSHIPS: KOKIRI NGATHI: THE TREATY OF WAITANGI IN THE 
NEW MILLENIUM, 107, 119 (1998).  For example, the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA), 43 U.S.C.A. §1606(2000), granted indigenous peoples of 
Alaska title to over 40 million acres of land and $1 billion (U.S. dollars) in return 
for the extinguishment of aboriginal title in the state. It was hailed at first, but is 
now severely criticized by natives.  There was a virtual absence of implementation 
mechanisms and a failure to address fundamental questions of state-native 
relations. New claims are now resurfacing.  Id. at 117. 
 163. Id. at 111; Ken S. Coates, Introduction New Zealand and Maori-Pakeha 
Relations in a Global Context, in LIVING RELATIONSHIPS: KOKIRI NGATHI: THE TREATY 
OF WAITANGI IN THE NEW MILLENIUM, 19, 31 (1998). 
 164. McHugh, supra note 162, at 111. 
 165. Id. at 170. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 171.  For example, In 1994 President Clinton set out principals for 
federal dealings with Native Americans. William J. Clinton, Government-to-
Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22, 951 
(April 29, 1994).  They focus on more effective day-to-day working relationships 
and respect for rights of self-government due the sovereign tribal governments. Id. 
 168. McHugh, supra, note 162, at 171 (quoting P.S. Deloria & R. Laurence, 
Negotiating Tribal-State “Full-Faith and Credit” Agreements: The Topology of Negotiation 
and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365, 390-91 (1994). 
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perhaps is missing, however, is an acceptance that these initiatives, 
grounded in Maori participation and consent, are an expression of 
rangatiratanga.”169  Rather, there is a misperception that 
rangatiratanga leads to competitive and adversarial relationship with 
the Anglo-settler state.170  This misperception, argues McHugh, is 
fostered by the dominance of the claims process, the publicity 
given to separatist extremists, and to some extent, by the nature of 
Maori political discourse itself.171  While the claims process must 
continue, McHugh calls for a “parallel/supplementary political 
environment beyond it” that substitutes the rhetoric of finality and 
closure with an explicit more unified, coherent position on 
rangatiratanga, issued—perhaps in statement form—after 
collaboration with Maori.172  Such a position could stress the 
participative character rather than the separatist one.173  The Crown 
could formally recognize the “internal” sovereignty of Maori tribes 
subject to plenary power of Parliament.174  Inter-iwi matters could 
be left for Maori resolution, giving the iwis political and 
constitutional status.175  This might, however, result in the 
entrenchment of an iwi-based form of Maori representation in the 
political process, which would have to be expanded to include 
urban Maori.176 
In a response to McHugh, Roger Maaka prefers to avoid 
describing the relationship between Government and Maori in 
terms of competing theories.177  It is better to see the present reality 
of Treaty settlements as “an opportunity to re-conceptualize the 
relationship . . . to explore ways and means of creating a new 
genuinely post-colonial relationship . . . based on the acceptance 
that Maori are a sovereign people because they were the original 
occupants, never having relinquished their independence by 
explicit agreement.”178  This understanding of a relationship built 
on “interlocking sovereignties” rather than competing ones, 
concludes Maaka, “would require a major mind-shift by a number 
 
 169. Id. at 172. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 173. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 173-74. 
 175. Id. at 174. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Roger Maaka, A Relationship, not a Problem, in LIVING RELATIONSIPS: KOKIRI 
NGATHI: THE TREATY OF WAITANGI IN THE NEW MILLENIUM, 201, 204 (1998). 
 178. Id. 
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of both Maori and Pakeha . . . .”179 
4.  The Treaty and the Political Process 
My heartfelt thanks to the last term of Parliament for 
introducing MMP.  This has given a forgotten people of 
this nation—made forgettable by the whirlwind of endless 
reform—a voice in this House, a voice that will never 
again be silenced.180  
 — Alamein Kopu, Alliance List MP 
As both Bosselman and McHugh suggest, Maori participation 
in the political process is a means of achieving both rangatiratanga 
and the necessary mind-shift Maaka describes.  Prior to 1993, the 
electoral system was “first-past-the-post” (FPP), whereby candidates 
with the most votes in an election were elected to parliament.181  
According to research economist Brian Easton, this “winner-takes-
all” (WTA) process resulted in “a virtual dictatorship” once the 
majority party chose the prime minister.182  Only the outcome of 
the next election or the very unlikely possibility of the prime 
minister being overthrown could shift the balance of power.183  
Under this system, argues Easton, New Zealand was governed by a 
ruling elite that was almost exclusively Pakeha, male, middle-aged 
or older, and British-oriented.184  Similar to the United States, two 
parties existed that reflected the two ends of the same spectrum, 
and vigorously contested its center.185  As such, the political process 
failed to reflect the society, which was younger, of color, poorer 
and over half female.186 
Seeds of change were planted in the 1970s when the pastoral, 
export-driven economy diversified, the country became more U.S.-
oriented, and women and Maori were selectively introduced into 
governance.187  Despite dissatisfaction with the two traditional 
parties, says Easton, “the institutional arrangements were more 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Anthony Hubbard, Kopu’s 15 Minutes Over, SUNDAY STAR-TIMES, Nov. 28, 
1999, at A7. 
 181. BRIAN EASTON, THE WHIMPERING OF THE STATE: POLICY AFTER MMP 13 
(AUCKLAND U. PRESS 1999). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 28. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 29. 
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difficult to change, because they were at the foundation of the 
elite’s power.” 188 
The electoral reform of 1993 introduced a mixed-member-
proportional (MMP) electoral regime, virtually eliminating the 
“winner-takes-all” process.189  It is now extremely unlikely, notes 
Easton, that any single party will have an absolute majority and 
therefore unilaterally appoint a prime minister and cabinet with 
which to impose polices on parliament.190  Instead, a multi-party or 
non-majority-party government will emerge.191  In theory, with 
increased parliamentary supervision, policy will be of higher quality 
and evolve more slowly.  Policy will also incorporate real elements 
of party differences, involve more public consultation, and better 
reflect the electorate’s desires.  Groups which have tended to be 
excluded from the policy process will have greater influence and 
public sector spending will increase.192 
Prior to the reform, Maori were assured four seats in 
parliament as set out in the Maori Representation Act of 1867,193 
one of the few constitutional guarantees extended to Maori.194  
With the introduction of MMP, there was concern Maori MPs could 
lose their existing seats unless steps were taken.  Ultimately, Maori 
seats were retained, to be based on the number of Maori who 
register on a separate Maori roll in preference to the general roll.195 
As such, under MMP, each voter has two votes: an electoral 
district (or constituency) vote and a party-list vote.  Maori seats 
apply only to electoral district votes.  Those on the Maori roll vote 
for a representative of a Maori electoral district (a Maori seat), 
while voters on general roll vote for a representative of general 
electoral district (general seat).  For the party-list vote, the rolls are 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Electoral Act, 1993 (N.Z.). 
 190. EASTON, supra note 181, at 15. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 123. 
 193. Maori Representation Act, 1867 (N.Z.). 
 194. Although not explicitly found in the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori 
representation has been recognized as entirely consistent with it. NGATATA LOVE, 
The Treaty of Waitangi, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF MMP 42, 43 (Alan 
Simpson ed., 1998). 
 195. EASTON, supra note 181, at 36.  The “Maori Option” allows Maori to 
choose between enrolling on the general roll or the Maori roll.  The “Maori 
Option case” was decided in 1994 by the Waitangi Tribunal, which accepted Treaty 
relevance in a statute that makes no explicit reference to the Treaty.  DENESE L. 
HENARE, Commentary, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF MMP 49, 56 (Alan 
Simpson ed., 1998). 
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effectively combined, all list votes are totaled and party-list seats 
allocated to parties that competed for the list vote.  Lists are made 
up by parties, which place their candidate for prime minister at the 
top.196 
The impact of MMP on Maori is still being determined.  In the 
1993 election, four of the ninety-nine constituency seats went to 
Maori, in 1996, five of sixty-five and in 1999, six of sixty-seven.197  
Together, the Maori seats constitute the Maori Affairs Select 
Committee, which has been likened to the U.S. Congress’ Black 
Caucus.198  According to Ngatata Love, MMP has proved to be a 
shot in the arm for Maori who are now participating in much 
greater numbers in mainstream politics.  The frustrating feeling 
that enrolling was a pointless exercise (despite a statutory 
obligation) has diminished.199  MMP has also increased the 
incentives for mainstream parties to put Maori high up on their 
party-lists.  Real oppositional political parties are now seen by more 
Maori as means by which to affect sought after changes under the 
Treaty and to challenge the recent neo-liberal economic reform.200  
The more seats are contested, argues Love, the more discussion 
about Maori rights will occur. 201 
Despite these gains, Easton and others are more cautious.  
Popular expectations of MMP may have been inflated, providing 
only an illusion of political choice.202  In fact, the moderating 
effects of coalitions may mean that major policy changes are 
unlikely.203  Maori enrollment is still low,204 young voters lack 
direction,205 and confidence in Maori MPs is patchy.206  Ill-
 
 196. Henare, supra note 195, at 50-51. 
 197. EASTON, supra note 181, at 36. 
 198. LOVE, supra note 194, at 47. 
 199. Id. at 46. 
 200. See infra Part I.C.  The Mana Motuake party broke away from Labour 
citing the party’s inability to grapple with the issues raised by Maori within its 
ranks (self-determination).  It remains electorally insignificant, however.  JANE 
KELSEY, THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIMENT: A WORLD MODEL FOR STRUCTURAL 
ADJUSTMENT? 305 (AUCKLAND U. PRESS 1997).  Other Maori parties include: Mana 
Maori, Mana Wahine, and Maori Pacific. 
 201. LOVE, supra note 194, at 47. 
 202. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 316. 
 203. Id. at 316-17. 
 204. Enrollment Apathy ‘Reflects Maori Disillusion,’ N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 9, 1999 at 
A10. A month before the 1999 election, 135,313 people had enrolled in the 6 
Maori seats, 6,616 lower than the previous election.  Id. 
 205. Theresa Garner, Young Voters ‘Ripe for the Picking,’ N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 24, 
1999, at A10.  Researchers from the New Zealand Study of Values found young 
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considered party lists produce incompetent MPs and result in party-
hopping and instability.207  A dramatic rejection of Maori parties 
and a return to the Labour party in the 1999 election may have 
been due to a lack of resources and voters, as well as a lack of faith 
in stand-alone parties.208 
During the same election, the Labour party aggressively 
courted the Maori vote.209  It promised to strengthen the Ministry of 
Maori Development, close the gap between Maori and other New 
Zealanders in jobs, housing, and education, and create an 
international profile for Maori culture through a Maori tourism 
body.210  The focus of Maori within the party was to “improve the 
Maori economy and close the gap.” 211  As a result, in the November 
election, all five Maori MPs from the NZ First party were replaced 
by six Labour MPs including the urban Maori champion, John 
Tamihere212—with his “for Maori, by Maori” slogan.213 
Taonui has urged Maori, however, to reconsider their loyalty 
to the Labour party because it has “delivered little.”214  The non-
 
adults floating around, with no clear-cut ideological positions.  “They are lost 
within an individualist, isolationist kind of culture, and are at the whim of 
whatever forces come to bear on them,” says study director Alan Webster.  Id. 
 206. Richard Knight, Politicians’ Antics Seen as Turnoff for Maori Voters, N.Z. 
HERALD, July 13, 1999, at A5.  The “Tight Five” MPs in Parliament in 1996—all in 
the NZ First party—became known as the “loosies” and lost power. Audrey Young, 
MMP a Winning Formula for Maori, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 18, 1999, at A18. 
 207. Hubbard, supra note 180. 
 208. Rawiri Taonui, Maori Voters Should Revise Allegiances, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 2, 
1999, at A15. 
 209. Labour Pitches For Maori Vote, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 18, 1999, at A5. 
 210. Id.  Specifically the Labour Party promised to: help young Maori gain 
qualifications through a “modern apprenticeship programme”; develop 
papakainga—marae-based housing; support self-build schemes; hire more teachers 
in Maori language and all core curricula; and stage a hui (meeting) for Maori 
educators and community leaders to develop long-term plan.  It also promised to 
hold the Fisheries Commission accountable to both Crown and Maori and develop 
a “fair allocation model.” Id.  Other parties made promises to Maori as well: 
National: forward-looking; a  hand-up vs. hand-outs; NZFirst: loyalty; Maori Pacific: 
leverage; no deadline on Treaty settlement; Alliance: policies with vision; Mana 
Maori Movement: an independent voice; ACT: to close the gap; Greens: more 
funding for the Tribunal; United: budget cap of $200 million/year on treaty 
settlements; Christian Heritage: increased Tribunal funding. Young, supra note 
206, at A18. 
 211. Richard Knight, Maori Expect Labour to Deliver, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 29, 1999, 
at A7. 
 212. Donna Chisholm, Maori Voters Flock Back to Labour, SUN. STAR TIMES, Nov. 
28, 1999, at A3. 
 213. Knight, supra note 211. 
 214. Tanoui, supra note 208, at A15. 
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Maori majority will always dictate Maori policy, argues Taonui.215  
Maori could consider instead creating a pan-party Maori caucus or 
strategically using the electorate and party votes to produce pro-
Maori, not pro-Party results.216  Alternatively, two parallel 
parliamentary houses with provisions to prevent either dictating to 
the other could be formed.  Although non-Maori would reject this 
type of reform, Taonui argues it would be legitimate under the 
Treaty.217 
MMP delivers “more Maori into Parliament,” Taonui admits, 
but, it has not delivered the promised “Maori miracle in politics.”218  
Or as Easton observes, “It would be easy to argue that MMP restores 
(or strengthens) democracy in New Zealand. . . . But this is not 
enough. To have an effective democracy . . . requires . . . a re-
establishment of some notion of equity in public policy . . . .”219 
5.  The Treaty and “Civil Rights” 
The equity that Easton calls for is often associated with “civil 
rights”—at least in the United States.  This is not really the case 
with the Maori struggle.  Most often, Treaty and international 
“human rights” discourses dominate.  This may be due to the 
nature of New Zealand’s foundational documents.  New Zealand is 
one of only three democratic countries in the world without a 
written constitution.220  Rather, a collection of statutory law, judge-
made law, international law, and the Treaty of Waitangi constitute 
the nation and dictate rights talk.221  There is no judicial review of 
legislation222 and the final court of appeal remains the Privy 
Council in Britain—although New Zealand might eventually 
establish its own court of final appeal.  This would inevitably affect 
Maori who have always looked to the Queen as their Treaty 
partner.223  A break from Britain, the establishment of an 
independent republic, and the drafting of a constitution would also 
have serious implications.  Aspects of Maori lore such as marae 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. EASTON, supra note 181, at 123. 
 220. Steven Price, Law is on Shaky Foundations, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 3, 1999, at 
A12. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Privy Council ‘Too Far Away,’ N.Z. HERALD, April 9, 1999, at A8. 
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justice and collective ownership of land are already recognized by 
the legal system,224 but the New Zealand Law Commission believes 
that the nation’s law would be stronger if more value were placed 
on Maori tikanga (customs).  The law could then be better tailored 
to ensure the rights of the Maori.225 
The main existing anti-discrimination statues include the Bill 
of Rights Act of 1990226 and the Human Rights Act of 1993.227  The 
former statute secures civil and political rights such as freedom of 
thought, expression, and association;228 freedom from cruel 
treatment and unreasonable search and seizure;229 and freedom 
from discrimination on the ground of “colour, race, ethnic or 
national origins, sex, marital status, or religious or ethical belief.” 230  
The latter statute attempts to enforce international covenants and 
conventions,231 although it does not resemble them substantively.  
Rather than prohibiting discrimination generally, it merely 
prohibits specific acts in areas such as employment,232 public 
accommodations, 233 and housing234—and with many exceptions as 
well.235 
The complexities of defending Maori rights within this context 
and along side the Treaty settlement process can be best illustrated 
by examining two specific issues: affirmative action in higher 
education and the rights of wahine Maori (women). 
 
 224. Maori Customs ‘Need Equal Status,’ N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 13, 1999, at A8. 
 225. Angela Gregory, Mixing Cultures to Settle Disputes,  N.Z. HERALD, March 30, 
2001, at A5. 
 226. Bill of Rights Act, 1990 (N.Z.). 
 227. Human Rights Act, 1993 (N.Z.).  This Act replaced the Race Relations 
Act, 1971 (N.Z.) and the Human Rights Commission Act, 1977 (N.Z.). See generally, 
Jerome Elkind, Anti-Discrimination Law in New Zealand,  1 HUM. RTS. L. & PRACT. 
230 (1996)(outlining the prospects and problems of the Human Rights Act of 
1993 and related legislation). 
 228. Bill of Rights Act, §§ 13, 14, 17, (1990) (N.Z.). 
 229. Id. §§ 9, 21. 
 230. Id. §19. 
 231. Elkind, supra note 227, at 231.  These include: The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UN Treaty Service 171, 6 ILM 368 
(1967); (entered into force for New Zealand March 28, 1979); The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UN Treaty Service 3, 6 
ILM 360 (1967); (entered into force for New Zealand March 28, 1979); and The 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/10Add. 6, ¶34 et seq. 
 232. Human Rights Act, § 22, (1993) (N.Z.). 
 233. Id. §42. 
 234. Id. §53. 
 235. Id. § 44(4).  For example, an exception against discrimination in public 
accommodations is provided for “clubs.” Id. 
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a.  Affirmative Action in Higher Education 
If it broadens participation in a profession, a little social 
engineering can do no harm.236 
— New Zealand Herald 
The fluid nature of New Zealand’s foundational documents 
might work to the advantage of Maori in the case of affirmative 
action, which, unlike in the United States, goes largely 
unchallenged in court.  This is explicitly due to the Bill of Rights 
Act which excludes from discrimination “measures taken in good 
faith for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons or groups of 
persons disadvantaged because of . . . race . . .”;237 as well as to the 
Human Rights Act which permits “measures to ensure equality.”238  
Both of these Acts are derived from international human rights 
law239 and legitimize remedial efforts to equalize opportunities for 
those persons against whom discrimination is unlawful.  Under 
them, three elements are required in undertaking an affirmative 
action plan: that the plan is done in good faith; that the plan assists 
or advances persons of a particular race; and that persons need 
(and want) assistance or advancement to achieve an equal place 
with other members of society.240 
Because of their explicit endorsement, affirmative action in 
higher education exists in several forms in New Zealand,241 from 
quotas found in the law and medical schools242 to targeted 
 
 236. A Little Social Medicine, N.Z. HERALD, March 11, 1999, at A14. 
 237. Bill of Rights Act, §19(2), 1990 (N.Z.). 
 238. Human Rights Act, §73, 1993 (N.Z.). 
 239. See The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/10Add. 6, ¶34 et seq. 
 240. Frances Joychild, Affirmative Action—“Measures to Ensure Equality,” 1 HUM. 
RTS. L. & PRACT. 218, 223 (1996)(citing Amaltal Fishing Co. v. Nelson Polytechnic, 
Unreported, 29/1/96, Complaints Review Tribunal, Wellington (Decision 1/96, 
CRT 3/94)(finding that Nelson Polytechnic failed to show that its quota systems 
for fishing cadet courses were specifically needed by Maori and Pacific Islanders 
and could not rely on Government policy or mere statistical inequalities for such a 
showing)). 
 241. Shane Cave, Affirmative Action in Access to Education and Employment in New 
Zealand, 3 HUM. RTS. L. & PRACT. 15, 17 (1997).  Cave points out that affirmative 
action also received governmental support under the welfare system prior to the 
neo-liberal economic reform in the mid-80s.  Id. 
 242. For example, out of 270 places for 1999 admission, the University of 
Auckland Law School held open 32 places for Maori and 13 places for Pacific 
Islanders all of whom needed a minimum average of C+ and were to be 
interviewed by Maori and Pacific Islander panels respectively.  Statistics originally 
available at http://mark.law.auckland.ac.nz/1998/prospectus.html, but as of 
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education programs most often found in polytechnics.243 
For example, Auckland’s medical school, concerned for years 
with a lack of students of color, established an affirmative action 
plan in 1998 to attract and retain them.244  Maori and Pacific Island 
students are accepted under a special admissions process, with 
slightly lower school grades allowed.245  Personal qualities such as 
maturity and empathy now count as well.246  For Maori and Pacific 
Island health care students that need extra preparation, the 
medical school also launched a bridging course called Vision 
2020.247  Once formal studies begin, however, students face the 
same courses, examinations and standards.248 
In 1999, a record number of Maori and Pacific Island students 
were accepted to the medical school—26 of 104 students at the 
University of Auckland.  This was double that of 1997, despite a 
new fee structure raising costs.249 
Professor Colin Mantell, the head of Maori and Pacific Island 
Health at the University of  Auckland argues in favor of the 
program: 
Tertiary institutes need to change their vision to one 
where Maori and Pacific Islander students will succeed, 
and ensure that opportunities and support are firmly 
established.  There may be an initial educational deficit 
and the challenge is to strike that out as promptly as 
possible. 250 
Mantell also has asked society to “make the same shift in 
 
August 14, 2001 this website was not available. 
 243. Cave, supra note 241, at 15.  Ethnically targeted education programs are 
typically provided by the Government’s Education Training Support Agency 
(ETSA). 
 244. Andrew Young, Ethnic Mix Just What the Doctor Ordered, N.Z. HERALD, 
March 10, 1999, at A7. 
 245. Id.  The School used to accept only the top 150 applicants—i.e., those 
averaging about 82% over five bursary subjects.  Special admissions students are 
still bright A bursary students.  (Students sit for bursary exams in five or six 
subjects during 7th form—the equivalent of 12th grade.  Their top five marks are 
totaled up with 500 being the top possible score.) 
 246. A Little Social Medicine, N.Z. HERALD, March 11, 1999, at A14. 
 247. Young, supra note 244 at A7.  Forty students were enrolled in 1999 and 
would decide which health field to train in at the end of the year from nursing to 
physiotherapy to medicine. 
 248. Colin Mantell, Maori, Pacific Health Professionals Needed, N.Z. HERALD, 
March 10, 1999, at A15. The bridging program also offers a certificate in health 
science.  Id. 
 249. Young, supra note 244 at A7. 
 250. MANTELL, supra note 248. 
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attitude to provide opportunities for Maori and Pacific Islanders” 
so that they can be part of the health care team.251  He argues that 
no apologies need to be made for relaxing barriers.252  The 
program is welcome because it will improve services to and address 
the particular health problems within Maori and Pacific Island 
communities.  It will also increase representation of those 
minorities within the profession.  Moreover, the program does not 
drop standards when it opens up the admissions process. 
However, some New Zealanders are critical of the special 
admissions program, especially as market forces are applied to 
tertiary institutions.  Significant numbers of the special admission 
students are from lower socio-economic backgrounds.  Rates of 
non-completion by Maori and Pacific Island students at the early 
stages are as high as 50%.  Bridging programs are often 
underfunded and not compulsory.  The students often lack the 
requisite academic skills, do not make up this deficit in the time 
demanded by university methods of assessment, and suffer undue 
financial pressure.  Maori complain that because Pakeha control 
the universities they “do not yet adequately address the problems 
these students face.” 253  They are given heavy loads, expected to 
pass and not advised well enough.  With rising university fees, 
Maori and Pacific Island students can least afford to fail.  Yet, 
special admissions programs have yielded results.254  Undoubtedly, 
the debate will continue. 
b.  Rights of Maori Women 
What affinity can we share with white women if they refuse 
to acknowledge and take responsibility for their 
colonialism?255 
— L. Whiu 
The Government is under several obligations toward wahine 
Maori.  While it has been relatively meticulous in complying with its 
reporting obligations under the U.N. Convention on the 
 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Rawiri Taonui, Time to Set Standards for Tertiary Education, N.Z. HERALD, 
May 4, 1999, at A13.  There are now eight institutions in the north in which Maori 
can attain bachelor degrees in Maori studies whereas ten years ago there were only 
two.  In five years there will probably be four more. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. L. Whiu, A Maori Woman’s Experience of Feminist Legal Education in Aotearoa, 
2 WAIKATO L. REV. 161, 164 (1994). 
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW),256 the Crown must still address the need for greater pay 
equity, adequate childcare facilities, adequate valuation on unpaid 
work, and an end to domestic violence.257  In the area of domestic 
violence, Maori women in particular complain that not enough is 
being done—especially among their own people.  Merepeka 
Raukawa-Tait, head of the women’s refuge movement, claims that 
senior Maori leaders are spending too much time on tribal 
economic issues and enhancing their business portfolios while 
thousands of Maori women and children seek protection from 
violent partners.258 
The Crown also has specific obligations toward Maori women 
under the U.N. Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples259 and under the Treaty of Waitangi. 260  Although wahine 
have traditionally been active participants in the formal leadership 
structure of Maori society,261  the colonization process reshaped the 
foundational myths and restructured the extended family, leaving 
women dependent and marginalized both nationally and within 
Maoridom. 262  As Aroha Mead notes, 
[the] sexism which has occurred in Maori society 
originates more from colonisation than heritage, and it is 
 
 256. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Jan. 22, 1980, 19  I.L.M. 33, 33. 
 257. Mai Chen, Better Enforcing the Women’s Rights Convention, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS—HOW ARE THEY BEST PROTECTED 13, 17 (Paul Hunt ed. 1998). Even 
though the Equal Pay Act, 1972 (N.Z.) was passed nearly 30 years ago, the gender 
pay gap persists. The average weekly income for full-time female wage-salary jobs 
was 76% of that of men. Statistics show that in their early 20s, women’s median 
wages are already only 87% of men’s and they keep getting worse. Sandra Coney, 
Real Action Needed on Gender Gap, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 21, 1999, at C4. 
 258. Andrew Stone, Women’s Refuge Head Slams Maori Leaders, N.Z. HERALD, July 
5, 1999, at A5. Maori tradition, mana, colonization and unemployment are also no 
excuse for domestic violence, argues another Maori woman, Kelly Bennett.  “The 
traditional way is all rubbish.  We were born into the European way.  We didn’t 
even know the old Maori ways.  I’m ashamed and disgusted with my people.” 
Carroll Du Chateau, Welfare Worker Ashamed of Aggressive Maori Men, N.Z. HERALD, 
Aug. 26, 1999, at A3. 
 259. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
Aug. 26, 1994, 34  I.L.M. 541, 548. 
 260. MELBOURNE, supra note 10, at 72. 
 261. Id. at 72.  In keeping with the Maori worldview  that acknowledged 
balance and interrelationship, both men and women were essential parts in the 
collective whole, including the sharing of power.  See generally, R. KAHUKIWA & P. 
WAHINE TOA GRACE, WOMEN OF MAORI MYTH (1984). 
 262. Linda Smith, MaoriWomen: Discourse, Projects and Mana Wahine, in WOMEN 
AND EDUCATION IN AOTEAROA 34 (S. Middleton & A. Jones eds., 1992). 
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a problem as common in international indigenous 
societies as is alienation of lands and resources.  Maori 
leadership has got to work this through and de-
programme all that does not rightfully belong within our 
Iwi histories.  Maori women, as we all know, are the 
backbone of Maori society. . . . It is unfair, soul destroying 
and a tragic waste of much needed skill, energy and 
commitment, to continue to deny Maori women their 
rightful place in Iwi/Maori decision-making.263 
The resulting inequality manifests itself today in exclusion of 
Maori women from meaningful roles in the Treaty settlement 
process.  The Maori Women’s Welfare League, for example, 
recently lodged a claim with the Waitangi Tribunal against the 
Crown for failing to protect the rights of Maori women in the 
Fisheries case.264  Dame Georgina Kirby of Ngati Kahungunu and 
former National President of the Maori Women’s Welfare League 
sums up the claim in this way: 
We say they are giving away the mana of Maori women.  
We talk about the partnership role of the Treaty and yet 
the government denies us a part in that partnership. 
When the Crown sets up agencies and mechanisms they 
don’t consult with Maori women and they never have.  
They do not consider Maori women for decision-making 
positions.  It happened when the Fisheries Commission 
was established.265 
The invisibility of Maori women is particularly evident in the 
court proceedings themselves, argues Linda Tuhiwai Smith of the 
International Research Institute for Maori and Indigenous 
Education.  A case like this, says Smith, “is generally about 
philosophical issues where there’s a lot at stake politically, mana-
wise, resource-wise; all those things added up . . . silence women’s 
voices in the formal sense . . . .[I]t’s the whole process.”266 
 
 263. Aroha Mead, Maori Leadership, Address to the Hui Whakapumau: Maori 
Development Conference (Aug. 1994). 
 264. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 265. MELBOURNE, supra note 10, at 73. 
 266. Kei Whea Nga Wahine: A Conversation with Linda Tuhiwai Smith & Kuni 
Jenkins, in 3 FISHERIES & COMMODIFYING IWI: ECONOMICS, POLITICS & COLONISATION 
13 (1998). 
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6.  Treaty Fallout 
We must not lose our nerve now.267 
— Sir Douglas Graham, Treaty Negotiations Minister 
Before leaving the Treaty context, it is helpful to step back and 
see how it is viewed in its contemporary application.  In October 
1999, the New Zealand Study of Values found a significant rise in 
hostility toward the Treaty.  Those who wanted it “abolished” 
increased from a quarter to a third, and those who supported it fell 
from a third to a quarter.268  While there is no one set reaction, 
several prototypes emerge. 
As expected, there are those Pakeha who are unabashed in 
their desire to put an end to the Treaty process.  David Round, 
Professor of Law at University of Canterbury is most representative: 
A blight lies on our country.  It destroys conversations and 
friendships, sours all political discourse . . . encourages 
divisiveness, bitterness and hatred.  One side labels the 
other reactionaries and racists; the other replies with the 
labels of weaklings, dupes and fools.  It is the Treaty . 
 . . .”269 
Other Pakeha take a more assimilative approach, such as social 
critic Walter Christie: 
Race separatism was not the aim of the Treaty of Waitangi.  
It is far from desirable now.  From the outset the native 
New Zealanders adapted well to the modern world.  They 
continued doing so for some time until diverted. . . . 
Common sense should prevail.  We are one people, one 
society, one family where differences should enrich not 
divide.”270 
While still others, like Paul Spoonley, adopt a more 
benevolent, paternalistic tone: 
Restitution needs to continue because legitimate 
claims . . . should be recognized. But it may be time to 
invest energy and resources into other areas.  Grievance 
could be replaced by development, and a number of 
Maori organisations are well down this road.  There is a 
need to transfer negative welfare benefit spending into 
 
 267. Audrey Young, Waitangi ‘Nerve’ Must Endure: Treaty Minister, N.Z. HERALD, 
Oct. 8, 1999, at A5. 
 268. Courage is Priority for Treaty Pact, SUN. STAR TIMES, Oct. 3, 1999, at A10. 
 269. ROUND, supra note 12, at 25. 
 270. WALTER CHRISTIE, A RACE APART 233 (1998). 
40
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss1/10
09_FINAL.SPENCER 08.31.01.DOC 9/7/2001  11:55 AM 
2001] MAORI CIVIL RIGHTS 295 
more positive policies built around improving the skills of 
Maori, and making sure that they participate in economic 
growth and prosperity.271 
Maori also express concern with the Treaty settlement process.  
Some believe they need to rely on themselves rather than the 
Treaty, 272  while others simply have no faith in the process at all.  
Cherryl Waerea-i-te-rangi Smith has transformed a Mohawk piece 
on ways to scalp an Indian into “Twenty-one Ways to Take Away 
Treaty Rights” which include: make the Maori a non-person 
(convince them their ancestors were savages, that they are violent, 
or make them wards of the state); convince Maori to be patient; 
make Maori believe that things are being done for their own good; 
insist that Maori “go through the proper channels”; set up a 
pretend court with no powers; play one iwi off another; and talk 
about what’s good for everyone.273 
New Zealanders who have not lost faith, also express a range of 
responses.  There are those who are equally adamant about the 
need to maintain the Treaty process: 
Pakeha critics of the Treaty argue that parliamentary 
democracy and the rule of law are . . . sufficient for 
[peaceful co-existence].  Maori will reply that this is simply 
a recipe for the tyranny of the majority . . . The history of 
New Zealand land law would serve to prove them right . . . 
New Zealand is fortunate to have a founding statement of 
principles . . . by which the relations of Maori and Pakeha 
can be mediated . . . .274 
And there are those, such as Taonui, that claim not enough is 
being done: 
There is a paradox when some New Zealanders, while 
attesting a sense of justice and protesting affordability 
return, cloaked in apologies, less than 2% of the lands 
unjustly taken from Maori, continue to enjoy the benefits 
they derive from the 98% they retain.275 
Yet Taonui and others also express encouragement: 
 
 271. Spoonley, supra note 104. 
 272. Angela Gregory, Maori Must Have Own Economy, Says Leader, N.Z. HERALD, 
July 30, 1999, at A14. 
 273. Cherryl Waerea-i-te-rangi Smith, Twenty-one Ways to Take Away Treaty 
Rights, in 1 THE FISCAL ENVELOPE: ECONOMICS, POLITICS & COLONISATION 30-32 
(1995). 
 274. WARD, supra note 74, at 2. 
 275. Taonui, supra note 139. 
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The treaty is an ongoing relationship . . . . It is nearly 160 
years since the treaty was signed.  We are not 15 years into 
that process of investigating losses, making reparations 
and, most importantly, determining how we can share the 
future.  We need maturity, courage and patience in order 
to persevere.276 
While some express hope: 
The treaty is, of course, a legal contract.  But it is also a 
statement of hope, a symbol of partnership, a 
commitment made by representatives of two different 
peoples to try to work together . . . [to] become one 
nation.  Like South Africa’s ‘Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission,’ the . . . . Tribunal is a forum within which 
wounds from our past can be healed and new 
partnerships forged . . . this will occur only if we . . . look 
honestly at personal prejudices, cultural differences and 
structural racism, as well as individual grievances. . . . 
And some even joy. “In ten years we’ll look back and ask 
ourselves why we didn’t . . . unleash all this energy before . . . .”277 
 In the end, the reality of the Treaty process is what is made of 
it.  Unfortunately, the Treaty is not the only context in which Maori 
must contend for justice. 
C.  Neo-Liberal Economic Reform 
1.  The Reform 
The evidence was clear that, with the onset of structural 
adjustment, the colonial legacy of poverty, dispossession 
and alienation that had operated since 1840 had taken 
another, equally pernicious, form.278 
— Jane Kelsey, Associate Professor of Law, University of 
Auckland. 
In 1984, heralded by Sir Roger Douglas, the traditionally social 
democratic Labour party unilaterally and cavalierly undertook the 
“New Zealand Experiment”—a pure neo-liberal economic reform.  
The National government continued “Rogernomics” with even 
 
 276. Taonui, supra note 103. 
 277. MELBOURNE, supra note 10, at 89. 
 278. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 285. 
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greater fervor after 1990.279  By 1999, the fundamentals of the 
reform were entrenched: market liberalization and free trade, 
limited government, a narrow monetarist policy, a deregulated 
labor market, and fiscal restraint.280  The reform continued, 
notwithstanding economic and social consequences281 and a 
prevailing view among New Zealanders that the theory behind it 
was morally and ethically bankrupt.282  Writes Kelsey, “There was no 
room for putting altruism ahead of self-interest, compassion ahead 
of efficiency, or mutual obligations and collective identity ahead of 
individual benefit.  Nor was there any doubt about the intrinsic 
superiority of the market-place.” 283 
As a result, the economic character of the country changed 
radically.  In the private sector, the successive Governments 
removed subsidies, ceased regulating the number of competitors, 
set about dismantling import protection, and exposed sheltered 
industries to global markets.  In the public sector, they transformed 
post and electricity into state-owned enterprises, trimmed railways 
for sale, and lifted the freeze from prices, wages, interest rates and 
dividends.  The financial sector was deregulated and the dollar 
floated, farm subsidies wiped out, and public debts exposed.284  
Increasing foreign control required Maori resources to be sold 
off285 while expanding Asian immigrant policies left largely poorer 
and unemployed Maori even more marginalized. 286 
The reform affected all other areas of New Zealand life as well.  
In education, the Governments transferred administrative 
responsibility to local school boards and, in order to reduce 
government funding, forced tertiary institutions to respond to the 
market—delivering private benefits to fee-paying students.287  More 
profoundly, education was defined as a private good.288  As a result, 
an elite student body emerged, under heavy pressure to recoup 
costs of education, repay loans, and pursue careers rather than 
 
 279. Id. at 1. 
 280. Id. at 2. 
 281. Id. at 11. 
 282. Id. at 271. 
 283. Id. at 335. 
 284. John Roughan, Our First Steps into a Brave New World, N.Z. HERALD, July 14, 
1999, at A14.  In particular the debts of Think Big, a huge public investment that 
gambled on 1970s oil prices, were exposed.  Id. 
 285. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 342. 
 286. Id. at 340. 
 287. Id. at 4. 
 288. Id. at 328. 
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vocations.  Intellectual interests became luxuries.  Market forces 
served women, Maori and Pacific Island students the least and hit 
them the hardest.289 
The Governments also cut back state expenditures “as the 
universal welfare state gave way to a limited safety net founded on 
the ‘fundamental principles’ of fairness, self-reliance, efficiency, 
greater personal choices, realism, and change management.”290  
Michael Joseph Savage’s vision of the “welfare of the people” as the 
nation’s “first and constant consideration,” which had placed the 
economy at the service of social justice since the 1930s, was 
superceded by a vision of the marketplace.291  Targeted assistance 
was easier to sell to the electorate than a universal welfare system, 
despite the required threshold testing, monitoring, and 
compliance checking.  As former Prime Minister Jim Bolger put it, 
“I am waiting for someone to provide moral justification, much less 
economic justification, to tax people on modest incomes so as to 
pay benefits to individuals or families who don’t need them.”292 
Consequently, the extent and amount of entitlement to 
welfare benefits were pared back—even as those persons forced to 
depend on them grew.293  Subsidized state housing was raised to full 
market value with supplements available for tenants in public and 
private rental accommodation or for homebuyers with strict 
eligibility.  Institutions for mentally ill, elderly, and young closed in 
the name of community care, and churches and charities were 
expected to cover government’s withdrawal from social and income 
 
 289. Id. at 329. 
 290. Id. at 272. 
 291. “The goal of New Zealand’s social security system, according to the Royal 
Commission on Social Security in 1972 was to ensure within limitations . . . that 
everyone is able to enjoy a standard of living much like that of the rest of the 
community, and thus is able to feel a sense of participation in and belonging to the 
community.” Id. at 271(quoting Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, New 
Zealand Today, Vol. 1 (April 1988)).  Standards for a fair society also included: 
dignity and self-determination; genuine opportunity  for all people, of whatever 
age, race, gender, social and economic position or abilities, to develop their own 
potential; fair distribution of wealth and resource including access to the 
resources; and acceptance of identity and cultures of different peoples. Id. at 271-
72(citing Report of the Royal Commission on Social Policy, New Zealand Today, 
Vol. 1  (April 1988)). 
 292. JONATHAN BOSTON & SUSAN ST. JOHN, Targeting versus Universality: Social 
Assistance for All or Just for the Poor?, in REDESIGNING THE WELFARE STATE IN NEW 
ZEALAND: PROBLEMS, POLICIES, PROSPECTS 93, 93 (1999). 
 293. KELSEY, supra  note 200, at 4. 
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support.294  Charity was compatible with the neo-liberal ethos, 
enabling the rich to choose how much benevolence to bestow, and 
on whom.295 
Kelsey also argues that an innate moralism and gender bias 
pervaded these attacks on the welfare state.  The Crown moved to 
force “responsibility” back onto the family, attempted to normalize 
monocultural, nuclear and patriarchal family, and displayed 
indifference to widespread evidence of domestic violence.296  It also 
adopted a new vocabulary that dehumanized the process.297  As a 
result, 
[b]y 1995, after a decade of radical structural change, 
New Zealand had become a highly unstable and polarized 
society . . . What were once basic priorities—collective 
responsibility, redistribution of resources and power, 
social stability, democratic participation and the belief 
that human beings were entitled to live and work in 
security and dignity—seemed to have been left far 
behind.298 
Nonetheless, the “New Zealand Experiment” was 
internationally “praised for getting the fundamentals right.”299  But 
did it, and at what cost? 
2.   The Socio-economic Effects of the Reform 
It is no coincidence that the biggest increases in income 
inequalities have occurred in economies such as those of 
America, Britain and New Zealand, where free-market 
economic policies have been pursued most zealously. 300 
— The Economist, 1994. 
The purpose of the neo-liberal economic reform was to 
increase growth and reduce poverty, neither of which occurred.  
Prior to 1984, New Zealand’s real gross domestic product was very 
 
 294. Id. at 5. 
 295. Id. at 291. 
 296. Id. at 332. 
 297. Id. at 335.  For example, “shedding workers” for lay-offs; “flexible wage 
rates” for cutting wages; “broadening the tax base” for shifting burden from rich 
to poor; and “incentives” for cutting benefits to force people into very low-paying 
jobs.  Id. 
 298. Id. at 350. 
 299. Paul Dalziel, Fifteen Years on and Economic Goals Remain Out of Reach, N.Z. 
HERALD, July 14, 1999, at A15. 
 300. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 271, citing For Richer, For Poorer, THE ECONOMIST, 
Nov. 5, 1994 at 19. 
45
Spencer: A White American Female Civil Rights Attorney in New Zealand: Wha
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
09_FINAL.SPENCER 08.31.01.DOC 9/7/2001  11:55 AM 
300 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:1 
close to that of Australia with annual growth rates of 2.7% and 
2.9% respectively.  Between 1984 and 1992, New Zealand’s real 
output remained virtually static while Australia’s continued to grow 
at 3% a year.  After 1992, the annual growth rate recovered to 
3.3%, yet still remained almost a full percentage point below that of 
Australia at 4.2%.  So while its economy showed some signs of 
recovering, New Zealand slipped behind Australia, with an output 
gap of $215 billion from 1984 to 1998.301 
At the same time, poverty levels grew dramatically, especially 
after social welfare cuts in 1991.  Ten percent of the population 
increased their share of total income at the expense of the rest of 
the country’s population, while the cut in the standard of living of 
the bottom 10% was 8.7%. 302  The number estimated to be living 
below the poverty line rose by at least 35% between 1989 and 1992; 
and by 1993 one in six persons was living in poverty. 303  “The issue 
of income distribution [had] simply been ignored,” comments 
Kelsey.304 
Unfortunately, “Maori were the most marginal of the 
marginalized.  Having been systematically stripped of the resources 
that guaranteed their economic, cultural and spiritual well-being, 
Maori were reduced to an underclass in their own land.” 305  By late 
1993, census figures indicated that in the ten years prior, the 
proportion of Maori in the poorest 20% of the national population 
had almost tripled, while the proportion of Pakeha among the 
poor had actually decreased by about one fourth. 306  A dual society 
was emerging and Maori were becoming an underclass with no 
“vested interest in democracy . . . .”307 
This income gap was compounded by past social policies and 
other pressures generated from a lack of attention to the culturally 
specific needs of the Maori. 308  As predominantly unskilled labor, 
Maori depended heavily on state employment.  In the 1950s and 
60s many iwis transferred resources in trust to the Crown in return 
for jobs, expecting them to be returned.  The increased 
 
 301. Dalziel, supra note 299, at A15. 
 302. Id. 
 303. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 10. 
 304. Id. at 243. 
 305. Id. at 283. 
 306. WEBSTER, supra note 22, at 42. 
 307. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 296 (quoting Ian Shirley, Social Development 
in New Zealand, Address at the Social Development Seminar (Aug. 5, 1999)). 
 308. Id. at 273. 
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corporatization and privatization under the economic reform 
allowed the Government to sell these resources, setting Maori adrift 
and rendering them even more dependent on the state.  Many 
Maori were also mainstreamed into urban workshops for the 
unskilled—lower paid employment in industries that had since 
been massively downsized.309  For this reason, unemployment and 
benefit cuts hit Maori disproportionately hard.310  By March 1992, 
the unemployment rate for Maori, who comprised 8% of the labor 
force, had reached 25.8% compared with an 8.1% rate for 
Pakeha.311 
Families in poverty also faced charges for health care and 
education, which were previously free.312  Devolution led to new 
forms of dependency on immediate families and voluntary 
agencies, which—although sold as a means to “empower the 
community”—were never properly funded.313  The burden was 
merely shifted from the state to primarily wahine “volunteers.”314  
The public symbol of this charity became the rise of the foodbank, 
which experienced an astounding 1,117% increase between 1991 
and 1993, serving disproportionate numbers of Maori and Pacific 
Islanders.315 
The “short-sighted, cost-cutting mentality” of economic reform 
also compromised Maori educational opportunities.316  The 
established link between socio-economic status, race, and 
achievement317 was exacerbated by the increased inability of schools 
in high poverty, non-Pakeha areas to provide for the needs of their 
students.  In 1994, “one in five secondary students was at risk of 
failing school because of poverty, severe behavioral problems, 
truancy, or abuse.”318  Maori students and those in poor schools 
 
 309. LAIDLAW, supra note 11, at 161. 
 310. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 285. 
 311. Id. at 262.  The rate for Pacific Islanders was 28.8%. Id. 
 312. Id. at 289. 
 313. Id. at 291. 
 314. Id. at 292. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. at 290. 
 317. NZ School Report: Could Try Harder, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 16, 1999, at A15 
[hereinafter School Report].  A 1999 report showed that a quarter of students at low-
decile (poor area) schools did not sit for School Certificate (two steps below 
bursary, which is required for university entrance), compared with 4% at high-
decile schools. Id. “Of the lower-decile students who did sit, most got D or E 
grades. Id.  Boards of trustees in poorer areas tended to have less management 
experience and educational standards were lower.” Id. 
 318. KELSEY, supra  note 200, at 290. 
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were even more likely to fail.319  Teachers in predominantly Maori 
schools were under rising stress, 320 as the gap between wealthy and 
poorer schools continued to grow.321  The market model was 
racially and economically polarizing education rather than creating 
diversity.  Teenagers from middle-class families in poor areas were 
abandoning their local schools for those in wealthier areas.  Over 
half the low-decile (poor) secondary schools lost more than 10% of 
their students after 1992.322 
 
 319. School Report, supra note 317, at A15. 
 320. Bronwyn Sell, Job Puts Load on Maori Teachers, N.Z. HERALD, July 12, 1999, 
at A16.  A report completed for the Ministry of Education showed that Maori 
secondary teachers are under stress, juggling teaching with looking after Maori 
students and promoting Maori language.  Id.  Maori teachers work an average of 
60 hours a week and one in five considered leaving, “citing stress, lack of support 
and feeling undervalued.” Id. 
 321. Wayne Bainbridge, Poor Schools Could Lead to Permanent Underclass, N.Z. 
HERALD, July 28, 1999, at A15.  Equity payments to poorer school have failed. Id. 
They were originally intended for economically disadvantaged areas (decile 1-4) to 
try to balance the advantages of schools, but funding is now extended to up to 
decile 9 schools. Id. 
 322. Bronwyn Sell, Cultural Shift Hurting Poorer Schools, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 16, 
1999, at A12.  These statistics come from a Ministry of Education report on the 
class of 1998.  Only 5% of secondary schools in wealthy areas had a similar loss 
while half of them had grown more than 10%.  Id.  To remedy these shortcomings, 
educational experts are calling for compensatory literacy intervention; homework 
centers; parent education; and mentors. Wayne Bainbridge, Schools Alone Can’t 
Solve Maori Underachievement, N.Z. HERALD, Nov.17, 1999, at A19; One-stop-schools 
providing food, healthcare, social welfare services have also been recommended.  
Catherine Masters, Call for One-Stop Schools: Feed-and-Succour Scheme Advocated, N.Z. 
HERALD, Oct. 5, 1999, at A4.  Others are calling for more culturally specific 
structural reforms such as correct pronunciation of Maori names; family-friendly 
meetings and programs; more Maori teachers and board members; Maori 
language; art and music around the school; bilingual and immersion classes; and 
high expectations.  Only then will the system shift from treating Maori as a small 
ethnic minority for whom a little provision must be made to true partners.  
Charmaine Pountney, Too Many Barriers to Maori Learning, N.Z. HERALD, July 26, 
1999, at A13.  Still others call for a strengthening of the separate Maori schools 
that already exist so as to escape a failed Western model of education.  Maori See 
Youngsters Being Schooled for Failure, N.Z. HERALD, June 25, 1999, at A9.  Currently, 
96% of Maori children go to mainstream schools.  Id.  In a 1999 report, the Maori 
Education Commission, set up in 1997 to reduce the gap between Maori and non-
Maori education, called for a separately funded Maori education entity rather than 
continuing with initiatives that patch on to mainstream curriculums.  Currently, 
the education system is tightly legislated and takes a Western approach that 
focuses on treating a “deficiency” in the child.  Critics feel that a separate system is 
not the answer. Richard Knight, Henare Supports Urgent Boost to Maori Education, 
N.Z. HERALD, June 25, 1999, at A3.  Nationwide, there are 770 kohanga reo 
(preschools) and 50 total-immersion Maori language kura kaupapa (primary and 
intermediate schools. Taonui, supra note 51 at A13.  More must be done, however, 
to meet the need for stable, two-parent, fully employed families with the economic 
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Moreover, between 1994-1997, the number of secondary 
students from poor schools going on to university dropped by 23%, 
while the number from wealthy areas increased 25%.323  A 
University of Auckland study showed the link between the 
economic status of the community from which a school draws its 
students, and the likelihood students will go on to tertiary 
education.  According to Professor Dame Anne Salmond, “The gap 
is widening at a frightening rate.” 324  Unless the trend is reversed, 
New Zealand will be unable to produce the skilled population for 
the knowledge-based economy upon which the reform is 
dependent.  In fact, New Zealand is already behind other 
developed countries in the percentage of persons with university 
qualifications.325 
Studies also show that student loan debt created by applying 
market forces to education disproportionately affected those from 
poorer backgrounds.  With fewer graduating, and those that do 
graduating with lower-level qualifications, poorer students now 
leave with less earning power and greater debt.  Comments Rawiri 
Taonui, “We run the danger of creating a class of unqualified and 
heavily indebted former students.  Rather than breaking down old 
barriers, we are creating new ones.”326 
Housing conditions were also negatively affected by the 
reform.  High market rents for urban state housing—although a 
false economy—contributed to overcrowding and the spread of 
infectious diseases, which are expensive to treat.327  In 1999, almost 
75% of people living in crowded homes were Maori or Pacific 
Islander.328  The market rents that low-income persons were forced 
to pay for substandard housing, showed the Government’s lack of 
 
resources to provide good health care, books, and language experiences. Wayne 
Bainbridge, Schools Alone Can’t Solve Maori Underachievement, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 17, 
1999, at A19.      
 323. Theresa Garner, Fewer Poor, More Rich Going on to University, N.Z. HERALD, 
Sept. 18-19, 1999, at A4.  There have been overall gains in Maori tertiary 
enrollments and graduates, however.  For example, the number of graduates rose 
from 400 to nearly 1,600 from 1990 to 1996. Rawiri Taonui, Poor Students Borrow 
More, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 25, 1999, at A21. 
 324. Garner, supra note 323. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Taonui, supra note 323. 
 327. Martin Johnston, State Housing Rents “Bad for Health”, N.Z. HERALD, July 
28, 1999, at A20. 
 328. Paul Yandall, Accusations Fly Over Housing Woes, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 4-5, 
1999, at A10. 
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concern for the urban poor. As one Labour party MP describing 
South Auckland put it, “What they’ve done is abandoned the poor 
here.  They’ve abandoned them and are now ghettoizing them.”329  
Substandard rural housing—sometimes in the form of overcrowded 
caravans, garages, and even cars—also contributed to serious 
health threats.  The Northland, for example, had the second 
highest rate of meningococcal meningitis in the nation in 1999, 
and some of the highest infection rates for other third world 
diseases such as tuberculosis, rheumatic fever and hepatitis A.330 
Health problems deepened among Maori in other ways as well: 
lower life expectancies, 331 lower immunization rates, poorer 
nutrition, and higher incidences of preventable injury, 
hospitalization, 332 and child death.333  Troubling social conditions 
also resulted in higher rates of suicide,334 family breakdowns,335 
domestic violence, 336 and child abuse.337  An economy of drugs and 
crime prospered338 and violent crime skyrocketed,339 especially 
 
 329. Little Change in Shoddy Flats, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 4-5, 1999, at A10. 
 330. Ken Lewis, Housing Shame for Poor Rural Families, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 14, 
1999, at A8. 
 331. Maori Rate Cuts Life Expectancy, N.Z. HERALD, July 13, 1999, at A10.  
According to 1996 data, Maori lived eight to nine years less than non-Maori.  Id. 
 332. Children Dying on Our Doorstep, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 16-17, 1999, at A5.  
“Nearly half of children in South Auckland live in areas considered among the 
most deprived in New Zealand.”  Id. 
 333. Danya Levy, Child Death Toll Disgraces Nation, N.Z. HERALD, June 8, 1999, at 
A11.  “New Zealand’s rate of 34 deaths per 100,000 people, is the highest of all the 
countries in the study.”  Id.  Lower-income families are at higher risk.  Id. 
 334. Martin Johnston, Suicide Up to Levels of 1930s Bad Years, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 
8, 1999, at A3.  “One New Zealander commits suicide every 16 hours on average 
about 540 a year.”  Id.  Male suicides rose 119% between 1974 and 1994, mostly in 
the 15 to 24 age range and among the unemployed.  Id.  Twelve and one-half 
percent were Maori, 81% of whom were male.  Id. 
 335. Deborah Diaz, Where Families Fail, N.Z. HERALD, July 17-18, 1999, at A6. 
 336. Andrew Stone and Jan Corbett, One Woman in Five Hit at Home, N.Z. 
HERALD, Aug. 24, 1999, at A1. One in three Maori report being victims of physical 
domestic violence.  “At 32.3% the rate is more than twice that reported by Pacific 
Islanders or Pakeha.”  Id. 
 337. KELSEY, supra  note 200, at 293. 
 338. Id. at 294.  Said one New Zealander, “In a country once renowned for a 
low crime-rate, where doors were never locked, children could walk alone to 
school and roam freely through parks and where old people could rely on 
neighbors for help rather than having to bar the doors and windows against them, 
something fundamental has changed.”  Jan Corbett et al., A People at War with 
Themselves, N.Z. HERALD, Aug. 21-22, 1999, at A15. 
 339. Corbett et al., supra note 338, at A15.  “According to figures from the 
British Home Office, New Zealand is now the most violent country in the 
developed world, leaving aside South Africa.” Id.  There were 1,121 violent crimes 
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among young Maori and Pacific Island males.340  Despite this, the 
Crown continued to cut back on legal aid. 341 
Kelsey quotes a feature story in England’s newspaper 
Independent to capture the full effect: 
[t]here is the feeling that something irreplaceable has 
already been lost.  For 40 years, New Zealand tried to 
build a civil society in which all its people were free from 
fear or want.  That project has now lapsed.  In its place is 
only a vague exhortation for individuals to go and get 
rich. 342 
It is no wonder that there has been sustained Maori resistance 
to the economic reform.  Devolution actually strengthened the 
revival of the iwi base and the emergence of urban Maori activists, 
resulting in increased demands for rangatiratanga.343  It became 
evident however, that “ . . . lasting settlements would not be 
achieved by negotiating with an elite of Maori entrepreneurs and 
imposing market economic models on Maori economic 
development.” 344  Nor would it be achieved by Crown demands for 
a “self-reliance and self-responsibility that could only be obtained 
on Pakeha terms . . . by assimilation . . . .”345 
3.  The Alternatives to the Reform 
The critical question in New Zealand was whether those 
Pakeha who now found themselves victims of the neo-
liberal regime would continue to side with the state and 
international capital against Maori, or whether enough 
would change sides and seek out a complementary vision 
and strategy for the future.346 
— Jane Kelsey 
Despite the entrenched nature of the neo-liberal economic 
 
per 100,000 compared with 861 for Australia and 610 for U.S.  Most were assaults. 
Id. 
 340. Jan Corbett, Why Do Maori Go Wrong?, N.Z. HERALD, Aug. 25, 1999, at A13.  
Although only 15% of population, Maori men account for 35% of the arrests for 
violence. Id.  This was down from 45% in 1995. Id.  Pacific Islanders make up 
almost 5% of population and 15% of violent offences. Id. 
 341. Naomi Larkin, Lawyers Angry at Legal Aid Cuts, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 5, 1999, 
at A1. 
 342. KELSEY, supra  note 200, at 8. 
 343. Id. at 319. 
 344. Id. at 320. 
 345. LAIDLAW, supra  note 11, at 161. 
 346. KELSEY, supra  note 200, at 347. 
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reforms, Kelsey and others believe there are alternatives.  Opinion 
polls taken during the 1990s indicate that the majority of New 
Zealanders support greater public expenditure in areas such as 
education and health care in place of tax cuts.347  Because 
economic policy “should reflect the values people want to live by,” 
argues Kelly, it should incorporate concepts like cooperation, 
loyalty and reciprocity.348  She proposes a “gentler combination of 
liberalization with managed mixed economy, welfare state, and 
corporatist labor policy.”  She also urges the adoption of a 
community economic model that values family, household and 
volunteer work and that allows people “to genuinely participate in 
the economic decision that affect their lives.”349 
Rob Cooper, in a paper prepared for the Maori Council of 
Churches, describes true Maori economic development in similar 
terms.  Rejecting individualism and self-interest, he calls for an 
integrated and harmonious balance of socio-economic factors that 
advance Maori life according to their own values of reciprocity, 
enduring collective responsibility, and a binding spiritual 
relationship with each other and with nature.  He desires 
restoration of Maori lands and access to the benefits of Western 
knowledge and technology for adaptation according to Maori 
ways.350  Manuka Henare, Senior Lecturer in Maori Business 
Development agrees, emphasizing a Maori worldview that includes 
ethics of te ao marama (wholeness); mauri (vitalism); hua (obligatory 
reciprocity in relationships and economics), whanau (extended 
family), tika (justice), kotahitanga (solidarity); kaitiakitanga 
(guardianship of creation), and wairuatanga (spirituality). 351  From 
these ethics, argues Henare, an economy of affection could 
emerge.352 
To assure their economic survival, the Crown has urged Maori 
to develop visionary business leadership, resourcefulness and 
 
 347. A Farewell to Welfare, N.Z. HERALD, March 27-28, 1999, at J5.  St. John and 
Boston argue that denying people adequate income support in face of 
overwhelming economic and social trends “is unjust and inefficient.  As a matter 
of urgency, social welfare benefits must be restored to a level that removes the 
need for food-banks and other charities to meet . . . basic living standards.” 
BOSTON & ST. JOHN, supra note 292, at 316. 
 348. KELSEY, supra  note 200, at 358-59. 
 349. Id. at 363. 
 350. Id. at 364. 
 351. Manuka Henare, Sustainable Social Policy, in  REDESIGNING THE WELFARE 
STATE IN NEW ZEALAND: PROBLEMS, POLICIES, PROSPECTS 39, 40 (1999). 
 352. Id. 
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cooperation—perhaps by recognizing the skills of younger, 
educated Maori.353  Other strategies have emerged from economic 
summits and national hui (meetings) such as establishing a 
separate Maori economy and treasury.354  This approach, however, 
would leave Pakeha privilege untouched and fail to unite the 
nation. 
III. PATTERNS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Tutira mai nga iwi, Stand forth, people, 
Tatou, tatou e; Let us unite; 
Tutira mai nga iwi, Come forth, people 
Tatou, tatou e. Let us be one. 
Whaia te maramatanga, Seek for enlightenment, 
Me te aroha, And for love, 
E nga iwi, All people, 
Kia tapa tahi, Work together, 
Kai kotahi ra, Unite together, 
Tatou, tatou e. Let us be one.355 
 
Several organizing patterns emerge as I reflect on Maori 
experience(s) and apply them to our nation: the need for us to 
adopt a de-essentialized and relational approach to building our 
own multiracial democracy, and the need for us to take action—
structural action—to actually build this democracy. 
A.  De-essentializing 
Webster reminds us that an essentialized approach to 
achieving equality will fail.  Just as many New Zealanders—Maori 
and non-Maori alike—envelope themselves in an illusory 
celebration of the Maori way of life, many Americans stand behind 
what we are convinced is a diverse, yet color-blind society.  By 
featuring our nation’s racial and ethnic diversity and by claiming to 
have eliminated any personal animus towards communities of 
color, we have, in effect, essentialized our own civil rights 
 
 353. Richard Knight, Maori “Lack Visionary Leaders”, N.Z. HERALD, May 18, 
1999, at A6. 
 354. Gregory, supra note 272.  This separatist suggestion came from the Tai 
Tokerau Economic Development Summit in Waitangi on July 29, 1999. Id. 
 355. HIWI TAUROA & PAT TAUROA, TE MARAE: A GUIDE TO CUSTOMS & 
PROTOCOL 71 (1986). 
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movement, rendering it incapable of fostering a collective struggle 
for structural change.  Although we have, like the New Zealanders, 
undergone a conversion of sorts since the 1960s, it has developed 
into a narcissistic one that masks the ways in which our society 
continues to perpetuate inequality—the ways in which our society is 
anything but color-blind.  As Leonard Steinhorn and Barbara 
Diggs-Brown argue, “our professed attitudes, symbols, and public 
expressions masquerade as integrated when our lives clearly are 
not.” 356  Coupled with poverty-entrenching neo-liberal economic 
reforms of our own, we have lost our direction.  Jerome Scott and 
Walda Katz-Fishman describe our situation and what it will take to 
fight our way out of it in the following way: 
The enduring reality of race coupled with the deepening 
polarization of wealth and poverty357 suggests that the civil 
rights reforms . . . did not transform the fundamental 
economic and political structures of American society . . . . 
The reactionary polices of neo-liberalism have come 
home with the 1996 law eliminating welfare “as we knew 
it”;358 reversal of the civil rights gains of the reform era; the 
mushrooming prison-industrial complex; anti-immigrant 
legislation; and attacks on job security, public education 
and public housing, health care and the environment . . . 
All of this makes possible a new politics of equality that 
challenges the hierarchies of capitalist domination 
comprehensively . . . Such a politics challenges not only 
racism (and sexism), but the system of global capitalism in 
which they are embedded and which makes the condition 
of poverty for the many a condition for the creation of 
wealth for a few.359 
Diversity and color-blindness are not the only notions we 
essentialize in the United States.  Returning a moment to 
 
 356. Leonard Steinhorn & Barbara Diggs-Brown, By the Color of Our Skin: The 
Illusion of Integration and the Reality of Race, POVERTY & RACE, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 1,3.  
John O. Calmore argues further that even this masquerade is fading, as “whites 
become more comfortable with the segregated status quo.” Viable Integration Must 
Reject the Ideology of “Assimilationism”, POVERTY & RACE, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 7. 
 357. See generally, DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN 
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) for a 
description of how race and poverty intersect in our construction of the American 
ghetto. 
 358. See The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996 (PRWORA), 42 U.S.C. 607 (Supp.III 1997). 
 359. Jerome Scott & Walda Katz-Fishman, The Politics of Equality, POVERTY & 
RACE, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 5,6. 
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Meredith’s discussion of the Maori subject, we can recall the 
danger involved in reducing identity to essential racial categories—
“Maori”, “Pakeha”, “black”, “Hispanic”, “Native American”, “white” 
etc.  Regardless of the fact that no one subject is unitary, static, or 
ahistorical, and that race is socially constructed, we use these 
categories in an essentialist way to carry on our discourse and do 
our politics.  Rather than liberating, race winds up further masking 
issues of economic inequality and powerlessness.360  In the process, 
Meredith warns, we “ghettoize” our subject’s potentialities and 
possibilities and back ourselves into a political corner where a 
plurality of subjects would suit us better.361  A recent New York Times 
editorial captures the fallacy of essentializing Native Americans this 
way: 
It is hard to imagine more potent symbols of the 
American West than Native Americans and bison, so 
much so that it is almost always easier to see the history 
and the myths they evoke than it is to see the present-day 
reality. Native Americans are not, in fact, repopulating the 
Great Plains as a whole. In the Plains states, with few 
exceptions, Native American numbers are growing almost 
exclusively on the reservations, which are still plagued 
with deep poverty, social fragmentation and chronic 
illness of a kind more commonly seen among the urban 
poor.362 
We also tend to essentialize black-white tensions just as New 
Zealand does Maori-Pakeha ones.  In doing so, we ignore “the 
profoundly different relationships” other communities of color 
have with the current majority and with blacks.363  This binary 
framework weakens solidarity, deprives one group of the benefits of 
the others’ experiences, and fosters over-identification with 
whites.364  While New Zealand must address bi- and multi-
 
 360. LANI GUINIER, LIFT EVERY VOICE: TURNING A CIVIL RIGHTS SETBACK INTO A 
NEW VISION OF  SOCIAL JUSTICE  309 (1998). 
 361. MEREDITH, supra note 64. 
 362. Unsettled Plains, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2001, § 4 at 16. 
 363. Steinhorn & Diggs-Brown, supra note 356, at 5. 
 364. Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Toolkit—Fit to Dismantle that Famous House, 
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 295-96 (2000); see also Carrie Lynn H. Okizaki, “What are 
You:” Hapa-Girl and Multiracial Identity, 71 U. COL. L. REV. 463, 480-482 (2000); 
Deborah Ramirez, Forging a Latino Identity, 9 LA RAZA L. J. 61, 63  (1996); Francisco 
Valdes, Latina/o Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-Identity Politics in Postmodern 
Legal Culture: From Practices to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L. J. 1, 15(1996); Robert S. 
Chang, Facing History, Facing Ourselves: Eric Yamamoto and the Quest for Justice, 5 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 111, 129 (1999)(reviewing ERIC YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL 
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culturalism, we must determine the extent to which the black-white 
paradigm remains useful in a multiracial society.  If we continue to 
essentialize race we hinder our ability to acknowledge that all 
groups have been racialized in unique ways.365  Rather, our 
employment of racial categories must be more multiple, 
intersectional, recombinational, tentative and fluid.366 
In other words, we need to de-esssentialize our racial notions.  
This can be done, argues Meredith, by developing a critical 
consciousness.  With such a consciousness we can challenge our 
own romantic—or not so romantic—notions of the nation’s many 
racial and ethnic subjects.  We can also then place the experiences 
of communities of color in their proper contexts as historically 
evolving, relational, changing in meaning, and “to be interpreted 
in terms of time and place”—as I have attempted to do with Maori 
experiences here.367  Once we examine how race is socially 
constructed and how we share so many other selves in common, 
the racial “Other” can become part of us and we part of them.  The 
idea, notes Peter Edelman, is to focus “more on what people have 
in common than on what differentiates them”—to unify rather 
than divide.368  Developing this consciousness can also keep us 
humble, says Meredith, as we realize that our position is no more 
unique than that of others.369 
De-essentializing the way we think of the racial “Other” can 
have monumental implications for the way we think, talk and do 
politics.  It can help us unmask our nation’s grave racial and 
 
JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1998)). 
 365. ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
154 (1998).  As one Native American scholar put it: “To the Indian people it has 
seemed quite unfair that churches and government agencies concentrated their 
efforts primarily on the blacks.  By defining the problem as one of race and 
making race refer solely to blacks, Indians were systematically excluded from 
consideration.” VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 168 (1969). 
 366. See John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause 
Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 
1949 (1999)(citing EDWARD W. SOJA, THIRDSPACE: JOURNEYS TO LOS ANGELES AND 
OTHER REAL-AND-IMAGINED PLACES 22-23 (1996) for a discussion of how cause 
lawyers should consider a critical strategy of “thirding-as-Othering” in an attempt 
“to open up our spatial imaginaries to ways of thinking and acting politically that 
respond to all binarisms, to any attempt to confine thought and political action to 
only two alternatives, by interjecting an-Other set of choices”). 
 367. Calmore, supra note 366, at 1928 (citing Michael B. Katz, The Urban 
“Underclass” as a Metaphor of Social Transformation, in THE “UNDERCLASS” DEBATE: 
VIEWS FROM HISTORY 3, 23 (1993)). 
 368. PETER EDELMAN, SEARCHING FOR AMERICA’S HEART 179 (2001). 
 369. Meredith, supra  note 64, at 14. 
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economic inequalities and disturb its powerful assimilative 
processes—processes that designate everything white (and male) as 
normal, unmarked, and innocent.  Our failure to racially integrate 
our schools, for example, is largely reflective of our inability or 
unwillingness to eliminate the structures within them—and within 
the larger community—that perpetuate segregation, concentrate 
poverty and assimilate all students into an essential whiteness.  Our 
recent welfare reforms do the same things—they ignore the 
systemic barriers facing persons of color trying to get off the rolls 
and they moralize the racial “Other” into a monocultural lifestyle.  
These dehumanizing experiences are common to the Maori as well. 
Learning to de-essentialize can also foster rangatiratanga.  In 
our case, we need to think not only in terms of Native American 
sovereignty, but in terms of self-determination for all classes, races 
and ethnicities.  Recognizing our multiplicity can help us achieve 
what Maori and non-Maori might find themselves achieving 
someday as well: overlapping sovereignties, rather then hegemony.  
This will require voting reforms like those in New Zealand that 
move beyond our “first-past-the post” and “winner-takes-all” system 
(which in every aspect is driven by essentialism),370 and that curb 
discriminatory ballot initiatives and referenda.371  This will also 
require the de-essentializing of the debate over the meaning of our 
own foundational documents and civil rights legislation.  Just as the 
Treaty of Waitanga is in the process of  “becoming” to all citizens, 
so must our Constitution, especially in the context of achieving 
substantive equality.  As Meredith puts it, traditions must not 
remain fixed and ahistorical, but must justify and re-invent 
themselves in face of a multiplicity of identities.372 
By de-essentializing, we can also avoid the either-or, dualistic 
approach to our discourse and politics that so often results in the 
triumph of the yell and the victory of the powerful.  None of our 
views, none of our policies can be as “black” or “white” as we make 
them out to be.  As Meredith argues, “We need an understanding 
of [every] debate that is more open ended and sophisticated, that 
emphasizes the ambiguities of the relations, the uncertainty of 
 
 370. See generally, GUINIER, supra  note 360, at 156 (advocating cumulative 
voting in the United States, which allows “any self-defined minority group to vote 
strategically to gain representation.”). 
 371. See Becky Kruse, The Truth in Masquerade: Regulating False Ballot Proposition 
Ads Through State Anti-False Speech Statutes, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 129 (2001). 
 372. Meredith, supra  note 64, at 14. 
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tradition and the multiplicity of identities . . . .” 373  The tensions 
between our various racial, sexual and economic selves—just like 
the tensions between urban and iwi Maori, male Moari and Maori 
wahine—need renegotiating in a multi-dimensional, strategic 
fashion that serves the needs of all citizens as well as acknowledges 
persistent structural inequalities. 
This means avoiding a singularly claims-based, litigative 
approach to furthering the cause, which Coates and McHugh argue 
has not suited Maori well.  Such an approach provides only an 
illusory sense of closure.  Take, for example, affirmative action in 
higher education in the United States.  In our effort to retain racial 
diversity as a legitimate goal in admissions policies, rather than 
confine ourselves to responding to litigation (which in every aspect 
is also driven by essentialism) we can attempt a discourse that 
opens us up to the “Other” involved.  Such a discourse can help us 
discover what it is we share in common that we want to achieve and 
how it is we can go about achieving it.  If we can see less of a 
monopoly of “merit” on one side or the other, and focus instead on 
the “student” and the “citizen who desires to contribute as an 
educated professional” that we find in each other, we may be able 
to reach agreement on how to act more inclusively and effectively.  
We may also be able to overcome the color-blind mentality that 
underpins recent anti-affirmative action rulings.  This would 
further enable us to uncover and deconstruct unitary white 
privilege and to rediscover the multiple significance of race that 
has, as Rumbles describes it in the case of “Maoriness”, been 
removed from the table.  Then, perhaps, remedial bridging—like 
the courses being offered at the University of Auckland medical 
school—and “bridging” in the larger relational sense can proceed. 
B.  Engaging in Relational Politics 
Which brings us to the second organizing pattern: our need to 
engage in relational politics as a productive source of social 
transformation—“where neither self nor other, we nor them, take 
precedence.”374  As is obvious from what was just stated, to speak 
about de-essentializing is to speak about relationship. 
Each of us is constituted by the Other; we cannot 
deliberate or decide without implicating Otherness.  We 
 
 373. Meredith, supra  note 64, at 20. 
 374. Meredith, supra  note 64, at 15. 
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are ‘Maori’ in relation to those who are ‘non-Maori’, we 
are ‘urban Maori’ in relation to those who are ‘tribal 
Maori’, we are ‘Maori men’ in relation to those who are 
‘Maori women’ and so forth.  To dismiss the other is to 
dismiss the self. 375 
A relational approach, says Meredith, will demand that we 
negotiate, collaborate, compromise, and sacrifice.  Forming 
“relationships of citizenship” is what he calls it.  Creating a “beloved 
community” is what Martin Luther King, Jr., called it.376  As the 
founder of the new Madison Society for Law and Policy, Professor 
Peter J. Rubin, argues, we need to reemphasize legal values such as 
compassion, equality and respect for human dignity, values that 
“have largely been read out of American law through the 
ascendancy of various strands of legal thought over the last 20 
years.”377  Senator Paul Wellstone also argues that we need to “make 
a place for all Americans at the decision-making table,” especially 
those that face major economic and social challenges.378 
From what I observed, the interactions that are the least 
relational in post-economic reform New Zealand are not those 
between Maori and Pakeha, or between urban and iwi Maori, but 
between the Crown and all citizens.  Compassion, mutual 
obligations, and collective identity, observed Kelsey, are now 
missing.  This then “trickles down” to the interactions between 
citizens themselves, pitting those with opportunity against those 
without—even on an international level.  A recent letter to the 
editor in the St. Paul Pioneer Press captures this anti-relational 
approach to economic policy, democracy building, and citizenship 
in the United States quite tersely: 
The primary role of government in [our] free democratic 
republic . . . is to create an environment that gives the 
individual equality of opportunity to succeed in life.  With 
 
 375. Id. at 15. 
 376. Facing the Challenge of a New Age, in MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I HAVE A 
DREAM: WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 22 (James M. 
Washington, ed. Harper San Francisco 1982)(1957). 
 377. Crystal Nix Hines, Young Liberal Law Group Is Expanding, N.Y. TIMES, June 
1, 2001, at A17.  The Society hopes to become the competitor to the highly 
influential and conservative Federalist Society.  Its first chapter, organized in 1999 
at Georgetown Law School, has 125-150 members and chapters will open the Fall 
of 2001 at a dozen law schools including Harvard, Columbia, University of 
Southern California,  University of North Carolina, George Washington University 
and New York University. 
 378. PAUL WELLSTONE, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL 206 (2001). 
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this freedom comes the individual responsibility to take 
the necessary steps to make the opportunity a reality.  If a 
person does not take advantage of a free public 
education, gets a criminal record, develops no job skills 
. . . this is not the fault of the taxpayers . . . The question 
then arises is this: should the contributing citizen pay the 
bill for those whose own failures led to whatever problems 
they might have?  In other words should we trade in 
freedom of opportunity and the chance of individual 
success for the welfare state?  I would hold that overtaxing 
the winners to build a welfare state for the losers is much 
more irresponsible than returning to the productive 
taxpayer a portion of his/her earnings.379 
Are we all “essentially” winners or losers, as this writer suggests?  
Is there no room for finding commonality?  And within this 
commonality, compassion?  Must we persist in employing hyper-
individualized rights talk without reference to mutual obligations 
and responsibilities?380  Can we find no room for reconciliation and 
redemption? 
C.  Taking Structural Action 
Because such a view is so exacerbating to the cause, it might 
help now to turn to the last organizing pattern that emerges: taking 
action to affect structural change.  The most powerful symbol of 
this pattern—and it is meant to inspire—is the urban Maori.  
Generally speaking, Maori (as multiple-selves, of course) inspire 
action because they embrace a “whole way of struggle” rather than 
just a “whole way of life.”  Urban Maori, in particular, inspire action 
because 
by refusing accommodation within existing institutions 
and hegemonic arrangements, they [seek] to expand the 
boundaries of belonging and in effect have emerged as 
‘new citizens’ . . . [and] as political subjects, in what 
Cornel West . . . terms a process of “new self-perception, 
in which persons no longer view themselves as objects of 
history, but rather as subjects of history, willing to put 
their own selves and bodies to reconstruct a new nation.”  
Urban Maori, like so many other social movements, have 
 
 379. Miland Lathrop, Government’s True Role, ST. PAUL PIONEER. PRESS, May 21, 
2001, at 9A. 
 380. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE (1991). 
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 . . . thus imagined and set out to shape their vision of 
Maori society, as they create space to live it, claim rights 
and entitlements for it, and through their own daily life 
practices construct and perform it . . . . [They] have 
offered a potential for reordering, restructuring and 
renewal. . . . 381 
As the global economy becomes more and more diversified, we 
will find ourselves like the urban Maori, without whanau or iwi or 
homeland, struggling to find new forms of community.  Martin 
Luther King Jr. put it this way: “[o]ur world is geographically one.  
Now we are faced with the challenge of making it spiritually one.”382  
In order to affect this transformation, we will need to resist being 
essentialized, avoid essentializng others and retain each other’s 
dignity.  We will also need to reorder, restructure, and renew the 
economic order, the racial order and all other colonizing, 
dehumanizing frontiers.  This will require  coalition building and 
direct action.  It will also require the courage that Maori exhibit to 
put our whole selves into the struggle. 
We can draw further inspiration from the structural changes 
that in 1992 went into creating an equal partnership between 
Maori and non-Maori members of the Anglican Church in New 
Zealand.  After a multicultural commission researched the Treaty 
of Waitangi and reported back to the synod, the Church rewrote its 
constitution, recognizing the Treaty partnership originally 
envisaged in 1840.  The rights of Maori and Pakeha to control their 
affairs were ensured in context of an ongoing relationship with the 
other ecclesiastical partners.  The new Church now has three 
cultural streams known as Tikanga: the Pakeha Church, the Maori 
Church (Te Pihopatanga o Aotearoa) and the diocese of Polynesia, 
all with implicit obligations to each other.383  Writes Anglican 
theologian Jenny Te Paa of the changes: 
The new structure has made Pakeha aware of their Treaty 
obligations and more open to examining issues of 
historical injustice . . . . For Maori it is like being set free! . 
. . . We rejoice in our ability to control events . . . . I am 
not aware of any other organization where the 
constitution and rules governing an institution have been 
changed in this way . . . [b]ecause the prospect of 
 
 381. Meredith, supra note 64, at 14. 
 382. Facing the Challenge of a New Age, in KING, JR., supra note 376, at 19. 
 383. MELBOURNE, supra  note 10, at 169. 
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changing existing arrangements is too untenable . . . . 
[This] model is being widely perceived as having 
enormous potential for other institutional settings.  It’s 
being talked about as a model for government.384 
Structural changes within our nation—like those undertaken 
by the Anglican Church in New Zealand—are imperative.  Many of 
our laws and institutions, although not explicitly racist, disempower 
persons and communities of color by perpetuating discriminatory 
conditions.385  Entire systems produce policies and repeated 
patterns of behavior that undermine our ability to create a 
multiracial democracy.386  We must ferret out these racist laws, 
institutions, policies, and practices and transform them.  Maori 
values such as wholeness, mutual obligation, stewardship and 
spirituality can help us achieve this transformation. 
As we wrestle with our own growing racial diversity and 
division, our own living history of colonization and injustice, and 
our own amoral, market-driven, global economy, we should 
embrace Maori experience(s) and allow them to inform and 
empower our cause. 
 
 384. MELBOURNE, supra  note 10, at 170-71. 
 385. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal 
Analysis, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, 449, 449-50 (1995). 
 386. Take, for example, law enforcement.  Tactics endorsed in the “war on 
drugs,” such as pretextual stops, have become “paths” followed by the 
organizational actors. While law enforcement agents deny that they are racist in 
targeting persons of color in traffic stops, racial profiling occurs nonetheless and is 
a manifestation of institutional racism. 
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